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Abstract
Remotely Piloted Aircraft operations are growing rapidly in the United States
specifically for the Department of Defense to achieve training needs. To ensure the safety
of the National Airspace System is maintained to a high standard, Remotely Piloted
Aircraft operations are being assessed on a case by case basis by the Federal Aviation
Administration for approval of a Certificate of Authorization. FAA guidance currently
requires the use of human observers to ensure safe separation of RPA operations from
other aircraft. The United States Air Force intends to use technology to replace the
human observers, but a safety assessment must be conducted for approval of any such
technology. The objective of this thesis is to examine the process and results of
traditional safety assessment methods used by the United States Air Force as well as
apply the same information as a case study to an innovative method called the influence
matrix framework. The influence matrix framework will be analyzed by applying a
clustering technique to gain insight about the benefits and challenges of the assessment
method for future systems.
RPA operations at Cannon Air Force Base, NM propose the use of ground-based
radars to monitor the airspace around the RPA. The Air Force Safety Center worked
together with MIT Lincoln Laboratory for the safety assessment process of the ground-
based radars. The knowledge gained in that process is documented in this thesis. Next,
that system architecture is further applied to the influence matrix framework for analysis.
The influence matrix represents the expected influence of element behavior changes on
hazard risk. The framework is manipulated with a clustering technique to analyze results
when changing the scope of the safety assessment method.
In this work, the application of the influence matrix provided insights into the
functionality of the ground-based radar system and usefulness of the IM method. The
clustering technique provided a foundation for a formal process to handle scoping
challenges for future complex system safety assessments. For the future, this research
will have to be expanded further to better formalize the modeling and assessment of the
influence matrix.
Thesis Supervisor: Deborah J. Nightingale
Title: Professor of Aeronautics & Astronautics and Engineering Systems Division
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is increasing the use of
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) in military operations. The rapid increase of worldwide
RPA operations over the last ten years has led the Department of Defense to increase
RPA operations within the National Airspace System (NAS) to meet training needs. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) publishes guidance requiring human observers
located in a chase aircraft or on the ground along the flight path to monitor the airspace to
ensure the RPA is safely separated from other aircraft [1]. The use of human observers is
limited in flexibility and has a high cost. Therefore, the use of Ground-Based Sense and
Avoid (GBSAA) technology is being proposed for use to ensure safe separation [2]. The
GBSAA architecture utilizes ground-based radar to provide surveillance of local air
traffic, allowing an RPA operator to avoid intruders.
For technology to be used, the FAA requires a Certificate of Authorization (COA).
Applying for a COA requires a safety assessment and review process before the concept
is approved for operation [1].
For a safety assessment, there is no one specific required method. Many different
methods are available [3]. Often methods are used in combination to assess the safety of a
proposed operation or system. Traditional assessment methods will be applied to
proposed RPA operations at Cannon Air Force Base, NM as a part of a Risk Management
Document (RMD).
Participation in the generation of the RMD will serve as the basis for this thesis.
The objectives of this thesis are to (1) discuss the research and results of traditional
methods used by the United States Air Force Safety Center, (2) use the same RPA
operation information as an individual case study application for the influence matrix
framework. The influence matrix (IM) framework models the system in a matrix format
and describes the level of influence the particular system elements have on a given
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hazard. This thesis will extend the use of the influence matrix framework by applying it
to an additional case study and analyze the insights gained.
First, background is provided on the current National Airspace System and how
RPA operations can be integrated. Second, the motivation for assessing the safety of
those operations will be explained followed by providing definitions and discussion for
various specific safety assessment methods. In Chapter 3, the system architecture for the
specific RPA operation at Cannon AFB will be defined and explained. This architecture
will be used to assess the safety of the system using traditional assessment methods and
the IM. In Chapter 4, the research conducted with the Air Force Safety Center will be
explained through the application of traditional safety assessment methods. Following
that, Chapter 5 will apply the same RPA architecture to the IM as a separate case study
for this thesis. Chapter 6 will assess the use of clustering techniques to manipulate the IM
to gain insights about the framework and the overall system safety assessment.
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Increasing Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations
In recent years, the United States has increased RPA operations because of DoD
military operations. The increasing number of flight hours for RPAs in shown in Figure
1. As of 2009, RPAs flew approximately 500,000 flight hours in Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom [4]. As of June 2011, the U.S. Government
managed more than 6,000 remotely piloted aircraft across the various branches: Army,
Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard [5]. The high volume of operations and
number of RPA managed by the United States requires testing, training, and support
operations within our borders to improve the operations and equipment used around the
world.
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Figure 1: Worldwide DoD RPA Operations [6]
As explained in the Unmanned Aircraft System Airspace Integration Plan, the
DoD currently has 146 RPA units based at 63 contiguous United States (CONUS)
locations. By 2015, the Joint UAS Center of Excellence (JUAS COE) estimates the DoD
will have 197 units at 105 locations - a 35% increase in units and 67% increase in number
of locations [6]. Figure 2 shows the expansion of DoD RPA base locations in the United
States. With this planned rapid expansion, there is a clear need for more RPA to operate
within the same airspace as civilian traffic, and because most planned basing locations
are not underneath restricted airspace. It is expected that the FAA will have to review
more safety assessments built for a COA, or an approved technical solution may be
implemented.
4A
2008 2015
Figure 2: DoD RPA Base Locations [6]
The DoD is not the only entity that has a desire to increase RPA operations in the
National Airspace System. The Department of Homeland Security indentified a need for
a more constant surveillance capability since manned vehicles are limited by the operator.
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The National Oceanographic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) proved to the
United States that RPA surveillance can be very useful for storm surveillance where
situations would be too risky for human pilots [7]. A NASA RPA monitored a 40,000
acre forest fire from a high altitude for over 16 hours as well as provided surveillance for
sea lions and seals from a safe distance along the California coast [8]. The U.S. Coast
Guard developed a RPA helicopter for future search and rescue missions. The City of
Tucson in Arizona uses a RPA helicopter to spray wetlands for mosquito control and has
been doing so for more than five years [7]. In June 2011, North Dakota police officers
solicited the use of a RPA to help find and monitor armed suspects in a large open area
[9]. These examples reinforce the need to safely integrate RPAs into the NAS for more
than just military operations.
1.1.2 Federal Aviation Administration Policy
The FAA provides specific policies to dictate requirements for the integration of
RPAs within the National Airspace System (NAS). The FAA is primarily concerned with
the safety of all the users of the NAS and regulations are established to promote a safe
environment for all military and civilian users [10]. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR)
14 CFR Part 91.113 (b) states:
"When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be
maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other
aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the
pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it
unless well clear" [11].
For manned aircraft, this regulation is currently satisfied by having a certified pilot in the
cockpit to monitor the environment directly around the aircraft. Remotely piloted aircraft
do not have pilot aboard the vehicle. Therefore, technology must be used to allow the
operator to function in the same capacity from the ground.
The challenge for RPA to "see" other aircraft drives special policies and safety
analysis to determine if the RPA is safe enough to fly in the NAS. Current FAA
regulations permit RPA operations within special use airspace where other aircraft will
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not interfere, but to operate outside those special areas the FAA requires a "Special
Airworthiness Certificate - Experimental Category" or "Certificate of Waiver or
Authorization" [10]. To obtain either, each operation must undergo a review by the FAA
to determine if the operation is safe.
The proponent RPA operations that seek a Certificate of Authorization (COA) or
Special Airworthiness Certificate must provide a solution in lieu of human visual
observers that has been determined safe by the FAA. Each safe solution must show how
the RPA can "see" and "avoid" other aircraft. The function of seeing other aircraft can
also be performed by sensors such as radar. The technology solution will be referred to as
"sense" rather than "see" other aircraft. The use of technology instead of humans must be
evaluated and tested for the FAA to determine if the system is safe to satisfy Regulation
14 CFR Part 91.113.
1.1.3 Sense and Avoid
A RPA operator cannot act as a typical pilot onboard the aircraft by simply using
his senses to monitor the environment. Therefore, procedures applied to RPA operations
differ. Since a remotely piloted aircraft does not have a pilot physically located in the
aircraft to "see" the surrounding environment, the operator of the RPA must rely on the
capabilities of various sensors and the communication of those results to the operator.
Figure 3 shows the basic systems needed for RPA sense and avoid. The "sense"
capability stems from the system function to detect and track other aircraft. The "avoid"
capability comes with the performance functions of the aircraft to maneuver in such a
manner that a collision does not occur [12]. For remotely piloted aircraft, systems must
work together to perform the "sense and avoid" functions. Air traffic in the airspace must
be detected by a sensor and that data will then be processed through algorithms to
transfer that data into a readable format on the airspace display for the human operator.
AirTrffc enors)Dat Processing Aisplaye Opemao
Figure 3: Example Sensing Architecture
For context, the rest of this thesis describes the assessment of using ground-based
sensors and displays to enable an operator within a control station to sense and avoid. A
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so called Ground-Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) system allows the RPA to operate
within a determined coverage volume where a ground-based sensor can detect and track
any aircraft in the area. The RPA operation at Cannon AFB provides a detailed example
of the GBSAA system and is explained in Chapter 3.
1.1.4 Safety Assessment
In order to have the FAA approve a COA, specific policies and guidelines must
be followed by an applicant organization [13]. The applicant organization for the case
study in this thesis is the United States Air Force. The USAF is seeking a COA for
GBSAA in lieu of visual observers. The application stems from FAA policy guidance,
stating:
"Applicants proposing 'see and avoid' strategies in lieu of [human] visual
observers, need to support proposed mitigations with system safety studies which
indicate the operations can be conducted safely. Acceptable system safety studies
must include a hazard analysis, risk assessment, and other appropriate
documentation that support an 'extremely improbable' determination" [1].
This guidance requires the USAF, in seeking a COA, to perform a safety assessment.
This thesis will explore the safety assessment process, specifically the tools and methods
used to conduct hazard analysis and scoping strategies as they are applied in the case
study.
1.2 Approach
The approach of this thesis is to gather data in collaboration with the Air Force
Safety Center using traditional safety assessment methods. Then, the data gathered is then
applied as a case study to extend the influence matrix framework. The IM describes the
relationship between system elements and hazards by coupling them together based on
the influence each element has on that particular hazard. It is expected to provide the
assessor insights about the specific GBSAA functionality and describe safety behavior.
The results and insights gained are compared to the traditional methods used and their
impact on safety assessment methods for future systems.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter will provide the necessary background information for the reader to
better understand the proposed RPA operations at Cannon AFB. This chapter is
organized by first providing a brief description of the NAS, aircraft flight rules, airspace
classifications, and specific safety assessment tools and methods used by the Air Force
Safety Center applied to Ground-Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA).
2.1 The National Airspace System
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the United States agency within
the Department of Transportation (DOT) that is responsible for the regulation and
oversight of civil aviation. The FAA maintains the operation and development of the
NAS that includes air navigation facilities, equipment, services, airports or landing areas,
aeronautical charts, information, services, rules, regulations, procedures, technical
information, manpower, and material [14]. Even some military systems are included as
they interact within the NAS.
2.2 Aircraft Flight Rules
The distinction between different flight rules is relevant to the GBSAA system
because they dictate what type of aircraft and safety equipment the RPA operations will
encounter in the NAS. When encountering aircraft operating under specific flight rules,
the GBSAA system sensor must satisfy requirements to promote a safe environment for
the RPA.
There are two sets of flight rules for operating aircraft in the NAS with
corresponding weather conditions: visual flight rules (VFR), and instrument flight rules
(IFR). Each set of flight rules requires different specific procedures for airspace
navigation and interaction with other traffic. IFR flight plans may be required for certain
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airspace classifications or types of aircraft operations. Specific weather conditions may
also force the aircraft into a specific type of flight rules [15].
Weather conditions are determined by a set of regulations established by the
FAA. For visual meteorological conditions (VMC), there is sufficient visibility for the
pilot to fly the aircraft based on the use of outside visual cues. Visual meteorological
conditions assume the pilot has the ability to see and avoid other aircraft without the
assistance of air traffic control (ATC) in most cases. In these conditions, aircraft can fly
under visual flight rules. For instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), aircraft
instrumentation for navigation is required to enable procedural separation from other
traffic as well as communicate and respond to ATC. These conditions require the aircraft
to fly under instrument flight rules. Pilots must receive additional training and
certification to fly in IMC conditions and the aircraft itself must be equipped with
additional instrumentation [15].
For RPA operations at Cannon AFB, there are two types of aircraft the RPA may
encounter: non-cooperative and cooperative. Non-cooperative aircraft are those that do
not have an electronic means of identification (i.e., a transponder) aboard. Non-
cooperative also denotes aircraft where equipment is or not operating due to malfunction
or deliberate action. Cooperative aircraft are those that have an electronic means of
identification aboard and operating [1].
The electronic transponder is important for aircraft because of the difference
between primary and secondary radar systems used in the NAS. The primary surveillance
radar system operates independent of the aircraft and does not require a beacon return.
The radar sends out energy and the energy reflected off any airborne object is sent back
to radar. The primary surveillance radar system requires large amount of energy and
when objects are further away, the returned energy may be too weak to provide an
accurate location reading. Primary radar returns may even be affected by weather [16].
Secondary surveillance radar uses the electronic transponder to interrogate an
aircraft for information. A signal is sent to the aircraft asking it to identify itself. Then,
the transponder sends identifying information and altitude back to the receiving station.
The signal from the transponder is much stronger than the returned energy from the
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primary radar and the transponder provides more accurate position information to air
traffic control than the primary radar [16].
The FAA published 14 CFR Part 91.215 stating an aircraft must be equipped with
a transponder to fly under IFR because of the higher degree of accuracy associated in
altitude provided by the transponder [11]. The accurate altitude information allows air
traffic control to ensure safe separation from other aircraft operating in the same area.
The GBSAA system must be able to account for worst case scenario which is
VFR aircraft operating between airports without the supervision of air traffic control.
This is the worst situation because the VFR aircraft is only relying upon the vision of the
certified pilot to see and avoid the small RPA while the RPA is limited by its sensors to
see and avoid the VFR aircraft. Adequate sensors must be in place for the RPA to avoid a
collision with all aircraft, but if the RPA can avoid the worst case situation, it should be
able to avoid all aircraft especially with the help of air traffic control for aircraft
operating under IFR.
2.3 Airspace Classifications
The description of airspace classifications is relevant to GBSAA to understand the
environment and different procedures the RPA will be operating in local to Cannon AFB.
Airspace classifications regulate what type of aircraft and safety equipment the RPA will
or will not encounter in each class. When encountering aircraft operating in specific
airspaces, the GBSAA system sensor must satisfy requirements to promote a safe
environment for the RPA.
As defined by the FAA, the NAS is divided into two area categories: regulatory
and unregulatory [15]. Regulatory areas include Class A, B, C, D, E and G airspace as
well as restricted and prohibited areas. Unregulatory areas include military operations
areas (MOA), warning areas, alert areas, and controlled firing areas [15]. Within these
two categories are four types of airspace: controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other
[15]. The operating rules for each airspace classification are different and each operation
within those classifications must be assessed differently. They directly impact the COA
and safety assessment process for each proposed RPA operation within the NAS. Only a
few of these airspace classifications are going to be simply defined because they are
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relevant to the proposed GBSAA system operations at Cannon AFB. The detailed
explanation of each of these classifications located near Cannon AFB will be explained in
Chapter 3.
AGI -abve ground I~osI FLA-t~ Iee MSL - mean sea level hW
Figure 4: Airspace Classifications [17]
Figure 4 illustrates Class A, B, C, D, E and G airspace. These airspace
classifications make up the civil airspace within the NAS. The hierarchy of these
classifications is as follows: Class A airspace is more restrictive than Class B; Class B is
more restrictive than C; and so on. Class G airspace is the least restrictive out of the six
classes. Class G airspace is also the only class of the six that is uncontrolled by FAA
services [15].
As defined by the FAA AIM, there are two types of special use airspace are the
designation for specific airspace operations:
1) Restricted areas contain airspace identified by an area on the surface of the earth
within which the flight of IFR or VFR aircraft, while not wholly prohibited, is subject to
restrictions. Activities within these areas must be confined because of their nature or
limitations imposed upon aircraft operations that are not a part of those activities or both.
Restricted areas denote the existence of unusual, often invisible, hazards to aircraft such
as artillery firing, aerial gunnery, or guided missiles. Penetration of restricted areas
without authorization from the using or controlling agency may be extremely hazardous
to the aircraft and its occupants [15].
2) Military Operations Areas (MOAs) consist of airspace with defined vertical and
lateral limits established for the purpose of separating certain military training activities
from IFR traffic. Whenever a MOA is being used, IFR aircraft that are not a part of the
planned activities and/or airspace activity may be cleared through an MOA if IFR
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separation can be provided by air traffic control authorities. Otherwise, the IFR aircraft
will be rerouted or restricted from entering. VFR aircraft will exercise extreme caution
while flying within a MOA when military activity is being conducted. The activity status
of MOAs may change frequently. Therefore, VFR aircraft are advised to contact the local
controlling agency for traffic advisories prior to entering a MOA [15].
Restricted airspace and MOAs are illustrated on sectional, terminal area, and
enroute charts for use at a particular altitude. These charts are a part of the information
governed within the NAS [15]. RPA operations in restricted airspace do not require
special authorization by the FAA.
2.4 Safety Assessment
Safety assessment is the structured process of examining safety-related behavior
of a system by defining potential hazardous states, determining if hazards meet defined
acceptable criteria, and mitigating any deficiencies that do not satisfy that criteria. The
assessment process can be performed for a system which is conceptual or already in
operation. The techniques and methods used to examine the safety performance of the
system are not always the same. Typically, the criteria for acceptable safety performance
are defined before the examination is conducted.
Acceptable criteria can be in the form of a required procedure, level of risk, or a
measure of system performance [18]. For this thesis, the level of risk is defined as the
probability and severity of an accident or loss from exposure to various hazards,
including injury to people and loss of resources [3].
Once the system safety performance is evaluated, the results will determine what,
if any, action should take place. If the results show the system meets or exceeds the
acceptable criteria, then no action may be necessary. If the results show the system does
not meet the acceptable criteria of safety, there will need to be mitigation. Mitigation
addresses unacceptable levels of risk by defining requirements for a system or changes to
the system that will change the performance of the system to meet the acceptable criteria.
The safety assessment process for the RPA operations at Cannon AFB includes
several methods and supporting documents to provide a complete evaluation. Remotely
Piloted Aircraft are complex systems operating within a complex environment of manned
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aircraft. FAA guidance does not define a determined safety requirement, nor does it
define what methods or supporting documents should be used to conduct system safety
studies. Further detailed guidance for constructing a safety assessment can be found
within the SAE ARP 4761 [19], the FAA System Safety Handbook [3], and Military
Standard 882E [20].
Currently Cannon AFB is applying for a COA for their proposed GBSAA system.
As a part of the COA, Cannon AFB is working together with the Air Force Safety Center
in the safety assessment process to present their results to the FAA. The safety center
chose a specific set of traditional assessment methods and supporting documents that
need to be completed. The first objective of this thesis is to discuss the research and
results of those methods. The method results will also be used to build the Risk
Management document that will be presented to the FAA as a part of the COA
application.
The selected methods and documents are: Functional Hazard Assessment, Fault
Tree Analysis, System Architecture Document, and Concept of Employment. Each of
these specific methods and documents will be briefly explained through various sources.
Each defining source may have slightly different definitions, but the general background
knowledge of each will be helpful to understand for this thesis. Each method or document
differs in scope and their advantages and disadvantages as they are applied to the safety
assessment process. The traditional methods will be applied in a case study for Cannon
AFB and will be presented and discussed in Chapter 4.
2.4.1 Functional Hazard Assessment
A functional hazard assessment (FHA) is a method of assessment that can be used
to provide inputs to manage risk, expose critical safety failure modes, or assist in
operational planning. The FHA can be a qualitative or quantitative analysis. The FHA
requires a detailed investigation of the subsystems to determine system components, their
hazard modes, causes of these hazards, and resultant effects to the system and its
operation. To conduct a fault hazard analysis, it is necessary to know and understand the
system elements, operational constraints, success limits, failure limits, failure modes, and
a measure of their probability of occurrence. Functional diagrams for the system and each
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subsystem are then reviewed to determine their component functionality. Risk levels are
assigned to the failures of each system element regardless of whether or not the failure
creates a hazard [3].
An FHA analyzes the potential consequences on safety resulting from the loss or
degradation of system functions. Using service experience, engineering and operational
judgment, the severity and likelihood of each hazard effect is determined qualitatively
and is placed in a class. For severity, class 1 refers to the most severe effect and class 5
refers to no effect. For likelihood, class A refers to a frequent occurrence and class E
refers to extremely improbable. The acceptable safety criteria determine the maximum
tolerable probability of occurrence of a hazard, in order to achieve a tolerable risk level
[21]. Figure 5 shows the Hazard Risk Index Matrix and how the likelihood and severity
of each hazard can typically be classified as a high, medium, or low risk hazard.
Fu 5H rd Rs Matlori [22]
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For the FHA, the system is evaluated in a functional perspective. This perspective
focuses on what rather than how the system produces a desired result. Functions include
required receiving inputs, sending outputs, and operating transition tasks. When those
functions are lost or degraded, the system will operate differently state, and that can be
hazardous to either itself or the environment. The functional perspective provides the
assessment an understanding of what systems are critical for safe operation. If a particular
system can be prevented from losing its function within the architecture, a hazard may
possibly be prevented.
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2.4.2 Fault Tree Assessment
A fault tree assessment (FTA) is a method of assessment that has the purpose of
finding hazards that result from single-fault events in a system element that may arise
from any system mode such as storage, transportation, or operation. It considers the
effects of a single fault within a system element and across system interfaces. Since it
traces the effects of a single-fault or component failure, it is sometimes called a single-
thread analysis [21].
This method is used to both prevent and resolve hazards and failures. It can be
used as a qualitative or quantitative method to identify areas in systems that are most
critical to safe operation. The FTA is a graphical presentation of a map of failure or
hazard paths. It usually begins with a defined undesired event, hazardous condition, and
systematically considers all known events, faults, and occurrences that could cause or
contribute to the occurrence of the undesired event. Analysis can provide insights into
system behavior, particularly the behavior that might lead to a specific hazard [3].
This graphical presentation of the system must include all combinations of system
fault events that can cause or contribute to the undesired event. Each contributing fault
event should be further analyzed to determine the relationships of underlying fault events
that may cause them. This tree of fault events is expanded until all input fault events are
defined to a basic level desired by the user. When the tree has been completed, it
becomes a logic gate network of fault paths, both singular and multiple, containing
combinations of events and conditions that include primary, secondary, and upstream
inputs that may influence or determine the hazardous condition [3].
2.4.3 System Design and Architecture Document
A system architecture description is a formal description and representation of a
system. The document is organized in a way that supports reasoning about the structure
of the system components or elements, the externally visible properties of those elements,
and the relationships between them. The system design description provides a plan from
which products can be procured, systems developed, and that will work together to
implement the overall system [23].
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2.4.4 Concept of Operations/Employment
The concept of operations/employment (CONOPS or CONEMP) is a verbal or
graphic statement, in broad outline, of a military commander's assumptions or intent in
regard to an operation or series of operations. This concept is designed to give an overall
picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose [24].
For Cannon AFB, the concept of employment describes the proposed GBSAA
operations. The selected parts of the CONEMP that will be included in the Risk
Management document are: a description of the arrival and departure area, the
operational airspace, what systems will be used, possible operating scenarios, and
assumptions and risks [2].
2.4.5 Risk Management Document
The safety assessment methods (FHA, FTA, Architecture Description, and
CONEMP) will be included within the Risk Management Document (RMD) that Air
Force Safety Center is building for the FAA COA application process. The methods used
are well established. Several engineering programs and projects have applied these
methods over the past decades and can provide many examples [25]. Being even more
specific, the FAA outlines the FHA and FTA in their published System Safety Handbook
that is used as a guideline for all FAA safety assessment material.
Risk Management is a decision-making process to systematically help identify
risks and benefits and determine the best courses of action for any given situation. The
risk management process does not wait for an accident to happen, it figures out how to
prevent it from happening at all. Risk must be managed whenever a system is modified
just as Cannon AFB will be through the use of GBSAA. All FAA operations in the
United States require decisions that include risk assessment and risk management [3].
The RMD includes a comprehensive evaluation of the safety risks being assumed
prior to operation of the system. It identifies all mitigations for hazards through specific
procedural controls and precautions that should be followed [3].
The document collects arguments, evidence and assurance through the assessment
methods to ensure that each system element as implemented meets its safety requirements
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and that the system as implemented meets its safety objectives throughout its lifetime. It
demonstrates that all risks have been identified and eliminated or minimized as far as
reasonably possible. This is important for a system to acceptable, so those risks must be
monitored for as long as the system is in service [21].
2.5 Influence Matrix Framework
The second objective of this thesis is to apply the influence matrix (IM) framework
to GBSAA. The IM framework is an innovative method for describing system safety
behavior that uses a matrix format presentation of how system elements influence and
relate to hazards [18]. The ability to model connections between system elements and
hazards can provide focus areas for risk analysis, mitigation, and test planning because
those relationships could highlight important patterns in the architecture.
The IM models the magnitudes of influence in the form of an m x n influence
matrix. The "m" columns of the matrix list the system elements, and the "n" rows of the
matrix contain the list of identified hazards. Each cell of the matrix is the influence of the
corresponding element to that hazard. The level of influence is defined by the matrix
author with the use of justification based on data collected and other safety assessment
tools [18]. The method will be applied to the RPA operations at Cannon AFB and later
explained in Chapter 4.
2.6 Discussion and Summary
The motivation for expanding research through application of the IM is due to
some weaknesses and complexity uncovered in the application of the traditional methods
described above.
One weakness of the FHA is that it does not discover hazards caused by multiple
faults. The FHA is primarily an evaluation of the effects of subsystem component failures
in all modes of system and subsystem operating. The FHA draws a clear connection
between a system element and its functions, but it does not provide a clear connection to
hazards. The FHA may even identify system element failures that may not result in a
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hazardous condition. Under some circumstances this can be an inefficient use of
recourses.
A weakness of the FTA is that it is a rigid diagram with limited possibilities of
describing the system accurately. As the system decomposes into lower levels of detail,
multiple system elements may contribute to hazards that are unrelated. It is visually
difficult to see just one level of the FTA and understand the hazard that each system
element is contributing to. The FTA requires the user to follow the tree from the top to
the bottom to better understand each branch as a flow of events or faults. The rigid
diagram structure of using an "and" or "or" statement with each branch limits the
possibility of how the system is described. A system element may create a hazard with a
combination of other elements, but it could create a hazard by itself too. A system
element may even behave differently in different conditions that changes it from an "and"
to an "or" contribution. Since the FTA is single-fault failure approach that expands
downward from that failure, the FTA may miss some non-obvious high level hazard than
may not contribute to that specific failure.
Both methods have common weaknesses. It is unclear when to stop applying both
methods as more system components can continually be added. An FTA can continually
be decomposed further into system elements and hazard faults. This can create a method
that has far too many pieces to see on a page or understand quickly. An FHA has a
similar problem with not knowing where to stop to have an adequate method.
Another common weakness in the FTA and FHA methods is over precision in
mathematical analysis when chosen to provide quantitative results. Analysts try to obtain
exact numbers from inexact or expert provided data. Too much time may be spent on
improving preciseness of the analysis rather than eliminating the hazards [3].
The influence matrix framework was first constructed in 2009 and will be
expanded upon through application with the USAF. The basic motivation for this
research is to use the IM to provide a better visual method for the user to understand and
model a particular system. The objective of the IM is to show the relationship between
system elements and hazards in one clear diagram. The FHA and FTA use multiple steps
and large tables full of information to show similar information depicted in a single IM.
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The IM application in Chapter 6 expands upon these ideas to gain additional insight about
safety behavior than provided by traditional methods.
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Chapter 3
GBSAA System Description
In order to apply the safety assessment methods described in Chapter 2 as a case
study to the Cannon AFB RPA operations, the proposed GBSAA system must be
described. The United States Air Force is seeking a Certificate of Authorization from the
FAA to fly RPA training missions through the NAS without human observers to access
nearby restricted airspace. This chapter provides details on Cannon AFB RPA operations
followed by a detailed description of the GBSAA system architecture.
3.1 Cannon AFB Operations
Cannon AFB is located in Clovis, NM, and is an established training base for
RPA equipment and crews because of its close location to restricted airspace and a
military operating area [6]. Within restricted airspace, RPA operations can take place
within them and the threat of colliding with air traffic is eliminated.
The airspace between the Cannon AFB runway and the restricted airspace or
MOA is civil airspace where other air traffic can operate freely. To safely operate RPAs
from Cannon AFB to the restricted airspace or MOA, the use of the Ground-Based Sense
and Avoid (GBSAA) system is being proposed. The GBSAA system will replace human
observers located on the ground. It will utilize the capabilities of ground-based radars to
detect air traffic to ensure the RPA remains safely separated while maneuvering in the
public airspace. The Air Force Safety Center is evaluating the GBSAA system to
determine if it is safe for use in the NAS [2].
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Figure 6: Cannon AFB Local Airspace [261
Cannon AFB, designated KCVS, is located 5 nm West of Clovis, NM at an
airfield elevation of 4,295 feet above sea level [27]. KCVS terminal airspace is shown as
a dashed circle around the airfield symbol just to the right of the center of Figure 6. This
is Class D airspace from the ground level to 6800 feet and extends out 6 nm in all
directions from the airfield. It is controlled by the Cannon AFB Radar Approach Control
and any aircraft can be directed how to operate within the airspace [2].
The airspace surrounding the Class D airspace is Class E airspace. It is depicted in
Figure 6 by the larger dark circle surrounding the Class D airspace and extends from
ground level to 10,000 ft. For the proposed GBSAA plan, aircraft operating in the Class E
airspace will be controlled by the Cannon AFB Radar Approach Control [2].
To the left of the Class E airspace in Figure 6 are three boxes that designate
restricted airspace and military operating areas. From the outer boundary of the Class D
airspace to the outer edge of the restricted airspace is an 11 nm distance represented by
the dark arrow in Figure 6 [2].
Class A airspace is positive controlled airspace at and above 18,000 ft. The
proposed GBSAA operation specifically prohibits the RPA from entering this airspace.
Class B, C, and G airspace are all airspace classifications that are not present around the
Cannon AFB RPA operations [2].
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Currently, three COAs have been approved by the FAA for RPA operations
within Class D airspace and Class E airspace located between Cannon AFB terminal area
and the restriced airspace 5104 [2]. The Class E COA requires multiple ground-based
observers to monitor the airspace. The Class D COA allows multiple RPAs to operate
within the terminal area without extra ground observers because it is controlled and
monitored by Cannon AFB Radar Approach Control. The proposed GBSAA system
expands upon these exsisting COAs by using technology instead of human ground-based
observers and does not alter the existing Class D COA [28].
Figure 7: Diagram of GBSAA System [61
The RPA will depart from the Class D terminal airspace at Cannon AFB and
travel to restricted airspace west through a transition corridor shown in Figure 7 and
represented by the dark black arrow in Figure 6. Also shown in Figure 7 is the use of
ground-based radar(s) to monitor the airspace used for operations.
The airspace the radar will monitor will contain a Zero Conflict Airspace (ZCA).
The term "Zero Conflict Airspace" refers to the concept that the RPA crew will ensure a
predetermined volume of airspace contains zero non-cooperative aircraft to authorize
operations in the Class E airspace. With the ZCA clear, the threat of other aircraft flight
paths intersecting with the RPA's will be mitigated allowing for safe transition to the
restricted airspace. The RPA crew will even consider any other aircraft that may be
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operating closely outside the prescribed ZCA volume to ensure those aircraft are not on
course to threaten the RPA. Cooperative aircraft can be allowed in the ZCA if ATC is
providing separation services to the aircraft. Cooperative aircraft that are not under ATC
control can be considered a threat to the RPA depending upon its flight path [2].
3.2 Generic GBSAA System
Airborne Objects I Targets
Class E
Airspace
Non-coopertive Aircraft
UAS
Avoidance
Maneuvering
Radar Data
Processing Unit
Radar(s)
Ground Contro
system (GCS) **.
Air Traffic Controller
(ATC)
Figure 8: Example GBSAA System Diagram [29]
The basic subsystems necessary to conduct RPA operations using the GBSAA
system are shown in Figure 8. The ground-based radar(s) detect aircraft present in the
airspace. This same data that Air Traffic Control uses for an airspace display is also sent
to a separate data processing unit. The processed data is then sent to an airspace display
within the Ground Control Station (GCS) where the RPA operators can visually read the
data and be alerted of any unsafe conditions. If a maneuver is needed to avoid a conflict,
the operator will execute that maneuver. Voice communications between the GCS and
ATC are conducted through Very High Frequency (VHF) radio or via land-line backups
[29].
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3.3 Cannon AFB GBSAA System Elements
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Figure 9: GBSAA Architecture Diagram [2]
From Figure 9, the GBSAA system elements specific to Cannon AFB are divided
into major groups: ground control station (light blue), radar data processing (orange), air
traffic control (green), RPA (dark blue) and all other air traffic (dark red). The following
sections explain the specific elements are included within each major group. In the
diagram, the boxes represent the system elements and the arrows represent the element's
function and the flow of information or action. The direction of the arrows indicates the
direction in which an action or flow of information is taking place. The green dashed
lines visually represent how system elements are located in the physical world. The Pilot,
Sensor Operator and Airspace display are all co-located within the GCS while the RPA
and All Other Air Traffic are all located within the airspace. They are separated into
major groups because the elements within the group play a similar role in the function of
the overall system even though they are all independent systems.
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3.3.1 Ground Control Station
The Ground Control Station (GCS) houses the RPA crew and aircraft control
consoles for the purpose of operating the RPA, monitoring the airspace, and
communicating with ATC. The GCS provides the hardware for flight planning,
situational awareness, and interface to vehicle. The individual system elements within the
GSC relevant to the GBSAA architecture are the Pilot, Sensor Operator, and Airspace
Display.
The pilot is primarily responsible for aircraft command and control during all
phases of flight while remaining vigilant to "Sense-and-Avoid" and maintaining safe
separation from air traffic. The pilot controls the aircraft through the aircraft control
console. This console consists of a joystick for manual aircraft control and a
keyboard/trackball for navigating the various system screens and inputting control
information into the system [2].
Input commands are sent through a communication link with the RPA by line-of-
sight (LOS) data link. If the communication link is interrupted, procedures will be in
place to reestablish communications. A radio intercom system allows the crew to
communicate within the GCS and with local ATC to coordinate maneuvers. The pilot is
held responsible to make all communications with ATC, but the sensor operator may be
directed to complete specific communication tasks if the pilot is too busy with other tasks
[2]. Figure 10 shows an example of the aircraft control consoles with the pilot and sensor
operator sitting next to each other.
Figure 10: Aircraft Control Console built by General Atomics [30]
The sensor operator is primarily responsible for monitoring air traffic by observing
the airspace display mounted beside the primary flight displays. The sensor operator
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maintains communication with the pilot about the air traffic shown on the airspace
display in order to coordinate safe maneuvers [2].
The airspace display is visible to both the pilot and sensor operator positions and
each have the ability to monitor the airspace. The coordination between the two crew
members adds a layer of complexity to the concept. Both the pilot and sensor operator
will be trained on the use of the airspace display and equipment as well as how to manage
crew coordination [2].
The crew members will work together in the following manner. First, if traffic has
been identified, sensor operator has the primary responsibility to judge whether it poses a
risk to the RPA. The pilot may provide judgment, but also has the responsibility to
monitor the RPA status and navigation displays. It may solely be the decision of the
sensor operator if the traffic is a threat. Second, both the pilot and sensor operator will
determine an appropriate avoidance maneuver, if one is necessary. However, the pilot
will make the final decision. Both vertical and lateral maneuvers may be used to avoid
traffic. Third, the pilot will perform the maneuver. Finally, the sensor operator will
inform the pilot when the RPA is clear of the traffic conflict. If the pilot agrees with that
assessment, the pilot will maneuver the RPA back to its mission profile [2].
The airspace display located in the GCS will be a stand-alone display separate from
any other flight displays. It displays aircraft locations received from the radar data
processing unit. Further details are provided in the radar data processing group in Section
3.3.2.
3.3.2 Radar Data Processing
The radar data processing group detects airborne objects and processes the radar
results to provide aircraft tracks that can be displayed to the RPA crew and air traffic
controller. This group of systems includes the ground-based radar(s), radar data
processing unit, and airspace display.
For Cannon AFB RPA operations, one ASR-8 ground-based radar located at the
airfield is used [29]. The use of radar is the primary means by which the pilot will remain
vigilant to see and avoid other aircraft along with the assistance of ATC services when
necessary. Multiple radar systems can be used together to provide the sensing function of
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the airspace, but for this research it is assumed only one radar is used. The radar detects
airborne targets that are in range. Detected targets can include aircraft with transponders
(cooperative), and airborne objects without a transponder (non-cooperative, e.g. balloons
or hang gliders). To ensure all airborne targets are detected, the RPA operations are
planned to remain inside the effective radar detection range [2].
The data from the radar will be transmitted to a processing unit. The radar data
processing unit will process the data through various algorithms to properly format the
data to use for the airspace display. Processing algorithms formulate aircraft location and
tracks based on the series of location data provided by the radar. The designers of the
algorithms will determine the criteria for the track and location of an aircraft that is
considered unsafe for the RPA. The unsafe condition will command the airspace display
to provide an alert. The criteria for alerting can be adjusted as technology or regulations
are changed in the future. The processing unit will output the properly formatted data to
be displayed and command alerts by the airspace display [2].
The airspace display is a monitor that displays formatted track data to illustrate the
current location, altitude, and heading of all detected aircraft. When commanded by the
data processing unit, the display will provide an alert to the crew to warn of a threatening
aircraft. The alert can be a visual and/or auditory alert. It is assumed that the airspace
display used within the GCS and Cannon ATC are identical hardware but are separate
units in different locations. They both carry out the same functions of displaying
information and alerting of a traffic conflict [2].
3.3.3 Air Traffic Control
The air traffic control group monitors and controls the aircraft within the airspace
local to Cannon AFB. The human controller directs aircraft to maneuver as necessary to
ensure airborne separation. This major group includes the air traffic controller and
airspace display located within the Cannon AFB Radar Approach Control (RAPCON)
tower.
An air traffic controller has many responsibilities, but for the scope of this
architecture diagram, the controller's only considered functions are to monitor the
GBSAA airspace display, maintain communication with the RPA pilot, and separate
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cooperative aircraft during all phases of RPA operations. The RPA pilot will
communicate with ATC through a VHF radio connected to the ground control station.
The airspace display in the RAPCON tower will be a stand-alone display separate from
any other ATC displays. It displays the airspace information received from radar data
processing unit. Further display details are provided in the radar data processing units
group in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.4 Remotely Piloted Aircraft
The remotely piloted aircraft is designed to perform reconnaissance missions at
medium altitudes with long endurance. The main interacting functions of the RPA in the
GBSAA architecture are to communicate with the pilot by receiving commands and
providing feedback through sensor feeds. The RPA is also detected by the ground based
radar for an accurate airspace picture. The airframe contains the following systems which
can have an impact on the system safety:
a. Communication link -The aircraft carries a line-of-sight data link [31]
b. On-board sensor (payload) - capable of carrying multiple sensors
including an electro optical (EO) camera. The full motion video from
each of the sensors is transmitted back to the GCS to be viewed. The EO
camera allows the pilot to observe what is immediately in front and
around the RPA [31]
c. Propulsion - turboprop engine [31]
d. Power - aircraft electrical power is generated by the aircraft engine [31]
e. Flight Control - the flight control system provides three-axis
aerodynamic stabilization of the aircraft. Flight control commands are
transmitted from the GCS to the aircraft via the communication link [31].
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3.3.5 All Other Air Traffic
All other air traffic is defined as non-cooperative and cooperative aircraft within
the airspace the RPA is operating. The function of air traffic is to be detected by ground
based radars.
Cooperative aircraft have an electronic means of identification (i.e., a
transponder) aboard and operating, as well as communicate with ATC to coordinate
navigation procedures. Non-cooperative aircraft do not have an electronic means of
identification (i.e., a transponder) aboard nor have active communication with ATC. The
equipment may not be operating due to malfunction or deliberate action [1].
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Chapter 4
Safety Assessment Process Application
4.1 Introduction
The Air Force Safety Center (AFSEC) is working with Cannon AFB to build a
Risk Management document assessing the operational hazards associated with RPA
testing and flight crew training operations in local airspace while transiting to restricted
airspace. The purpose of the analysis is to determine if the proposed Ground-Based
Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) system is safe. The results of the safety assessment will be
presented to the FAA as a part of a COA application. The report will include identified
hazards, assessment of the corresponding risk, and documentation of mitigation
strategies. This chapter will describe the process used to support the AFSEC in assessing
the safety of the GBSAA system and how the information gained from that process is
applied to the IM case study.
4.2 Safety Assessment Process
Common safety assessment processes steps are shown in Figure 11 [18].Starting
on the far left of diagram, the inputs to safety assessment process include a description of
the proposed system change that consists of change elements and external elements.
These external system elements are decomposed into interacting and non-interacting
elements. The GBSAA system architecture for this research constitutes the proposal
change, and was described in Chapter 3.
The safety assessment process is shown by the grey-shaded box at the center of
the figure. Included in the process are important sub-processes where decisions are made
that influence the safety behavior of a system. These sub-processes include: hazard/risk
identification, scoping, detailed assessment & modeling, and mitigation.
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Figure 11: Safety Assessment Process Diagram [18]
Hazard/Risk identification uses the description of the system to determine
potential risks and/or hazards associated within the architecture. The result of this process
is represented by a formal list of hazards. System experts can be used to build a formal
list of hazards that they consider comprehensive and complete. The team of system
experts can consist of any personnel or sources that can provide any level of insight into
the operation, behavior, or architecture of the system. The application of hazard
identification for the GBSAA system is described in Section 4.3.
The safety behavior of a system can be very complex. To better allocate resources
to specific areas of concern, the next step in safety assessment is scoping. The scoping
process results in an identification of the components for detailed analysis. Scope defines
the elements, risks, and conditions that must be included and excluded within the detailed
modeling and assessment. The application of scoping for the GBSAA system will be
discussed in Section 4.4.
In the process of detailed assessment and modeling, the safety performance of the
system is evaluated. Data can be obtained from a variety of sources. For example,
operational experience or expert opinion can be used as data to support the assessment. In
addition to the data, assumptions are made in the creation and evaluation of the detailed
model. Unacceptable safety performance that does not meet assessment criteria is
mitigated through safety requirements and various planned strategies. The process of
detailed assessment is described in Sections 4.5.
On the far right of Figure 11, the safety assessment produced outputs to support
an operational approval decision. The outputs of safety assessment include assumptions
made, data used, and modeling approaches. The approving authority determines
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acceptability criteria. The criteria are typically defined ahead of time by the authority and
the assessment tries to provide adequate results for those criteria.
4.3 Hazard Identification
The first step in safety assessment of Cannon AFB is the identification of hazards
related to GBSAA. To identify those system hazards, a team of experts was chosen by the
AFSEC that included personnel from: MIT Lincoln Laboratory, MITRE Corporation,
Cannon AFB, and the Air Force Safety Center. The experts collected data about the
GBSAA system to have an understanding of the proposed operations and focus their
knowledge on a specific system, function, or activity. Data collection started with
available supporting documents, like the CONEMP, built by the USAF and FAA that
provided an understanding of how a GBSAA system worked in relation to the RPA and
NAS. After data collection, the team of experts worked together to produce a formal list
of hazards.
To identify a hazard, the definition of a hazard must be understood because the
identified hazards describe and dictate the safety behavior of a system. A hazard is
defined as a set of conditions in the system that could result in harm to personnel or
property. Hazards have an associated likelihood, but do not directly have an associated
severity measure, as they are not occurrences. There can be several possible outcomes
from a hazard which can have different severity levels. A set of conditions or state can
only be classified as a hazard if it leads to an event that creates damage or harm to the
system or environment. Hazards that result in damage or harm are assigned levels of
severity based on the harm associated with them [18].
The hazard list was built by eliciting the expert opinions about the following
questions:
1) What are the inputs and outputs to each system?
2) Where do these inputs come from and outputs go to?
3) What function does the system serve?
4) How could this system fail?
5) What are the systems relationships to other systems?
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Subject matter experts began by building an architecture diagram (Chapter 3) to
represent the GBSAA. With an accurate diagram of the system, the experts could look for
hazards have may have been missed or suggest improvements to the system. The diagram
provided a focal point for team discussions of functions, failures, and activities as to
eliminate confusion about the system.
Using the architecture diagram with forward and backward searches, the list of
hazards was created and agreed upon by the assessment team. The forward search for
hazards was the process of beginning with system elements and identifying hazards based
on the failure or error produced by a particular system element. The backward search
began with system hazards or outcomes posed by the system as a whole then traced back
to any system element that could lead to the hazard.
One example identified hazard is the airspace display failing to show the crew
what is occurring in the airspace. In the forward search, the airspace display can
contribute to a hazard by not displaying any information. The backwards search links the
hazard of the crew not being able to see the airspace conditions while inside the GCS to
the airspace display element. The architecture diagram verifies this hazard because there
is a flow of airspace information to the crew from the display, and a break in that flow
impacts the crew's ability to safely operate the RPA.
Appendix A contains the full list of hazards identified for RPA operations at
Cannon AFB.
4.4 Scoping the Assessment
The scoping process determines the boundary of the safety behavior to be
modeled. The scoping process is important in any assessment because it determines the
results it can produce. As an example, an FHA is scoped to the appropriate amount of
system elements and functions each of those elements. An FHA does not consider the
sequence of events leading up to or beyond the failure of a system element. It is only
focused on the designed function of a system element. This scope dictates the results
because the FHA describes the failure modes in which the system elements may lose their
functionality. The FHA does not show how the loss of that function impacts any other
system element.
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The determined scope of the work completed with the AFSEC assessed the only
assess the safety behavior that contributed to the sense and avoid function. For example,
the scope of the assessment evaluated the pilot's function of controlling the RPA. The
safety assessment did not include the pilot's need to stay awake while operating the
aircraft. Mitigation strategies and policies are already in place to handle the example and
other out of scope hazards.
Within the GBSAA system architecture, an RPA is the primary system involved.
Unfortunately, the RPA has its own set of hazards associated with it regardless of where
it is flying. The decision was made to focus on the new hazards produced by flying the
RPA in the pubic airspace and using the GBSAA solution, with the understanding that
the hazards the RPA inherently brings with its use still have a contribution to the overall
safety of the GBSAA solution.
The scope of the assessment was narrowed further through the use of an
airworthiness certification. BY legal authority, the DoD certifies the airworthiness of
public aircraft, and the FAA recognizes that certification. For the RPA to be considered
airworthy, both the aircraft and all of the other associated support equipment of the RPA
as already undergone a safety assessment. If any element of the aircraft is not in condition
for safe operation, then the RPA would not be considered airworthy [1]. If the RPA is
airworthy, then the aircraft elements are assumed to be able to execute sense and avoid
maneuvers.
4.5 Detailed Assessment and Modeling
To assess the GBSAA system at Cannon AFB, the AFSEC chose between many
models and safety assessment tools. The AFSEC chose to model the system with
commonly understood and widely used methods of a Functional Hazard Assessment and
Fault Tree Analysis to support the Risk Management document.
4.5.1 Functional Hazard Assessment Application
Using the systems architecture described in the Chapter 3 an FHA was built using
SAE ARP 4761 as a guidance document [19]. The FHA results are provided in Appendix
B as a reference. The FHA models the system elements included within the architecture
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through a functional description of each element and how those functions could fail. The
failure condition of a function may or may not lead to a hazard.
The FHA was completed to verify and confirm that all hazards were identified for
the GBSAA system. Each of the identified failure conditions was compared to the formal
list of hazards to examine if any failure condition that lead to a hazard was missed. After
examination, each failure condition was successfully paired by an identified hazard and
that provided confidence and verification to the team of experts that all operational
hazards had been identified.
4.5.2 Fault Tree Analysis Application
The FTA is a top-down process that starts with a high level hazard and breaks the
system down into faults of elements that contribute to the overall hazard. The AFSEC
began with the most critical hazard of mid-air collision (MAC) and described all the
faults that could contribute to that condition. The FTA for the GBSAA system is included
in Appendix C.
The FTA modeled the GBSAA system by describing the contributing elements to
each single fault event that contributed to a MAC. By decomposing the contributing
elements to particular hazardous conditions, insight is gained as to how each element
impacts various hazards. Some elements may only impact one hazard while other
elements may impact several different hazards.
In addition to seeing how many hazards an element influences, probabilities of
failure can influence how the system element contributes to a hazard. The assigned
probabilities can provide quantitative results to determine the risk of different outcomes
through the tree. The "or" and "and" gates of the FTA structure determine how the
mathematical functions operate in relationship to each hazardous condition. The
probability of a hazardous condition at any level of the tree can be computed using the
mathematical functions and failure probabilities of the elements that are decomposed
below the hazard of focus. The entire tree will ultimately provide a risk value to the
outcome listed at the highest level of the tree. For the example shown in Appendix C,
quantitative probabilities could be used to determine the overall probability of a MAC
occurring.
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The mathematical functions of the "or" gate or an "and" gates can describe the
criticality of a system element in relationship to the outcome. If a hazardous outcome can
occur due to one system failure in an "or" situation rather than requiring a combination of
failures, stronger mitigation may need to be implemented.
4.6 Discussion of the Safety Assessment Completed for Air Force
The Hazard Identification process is limited by the human personnel that identify
and build the formal list. First, the selection of those included on the team of experts
creates a limit of knowledge. Experts are selected based on the knowledge of the existing
RPA systems and proposed GBSAA solution. Some individuals may also have
experience and knowledge with prior safety assessments of other RPA operations. The
Air Force Safety Center intended to have experts with broad general knowledge and
specific expertise knowledge on many subjects that can be related to the GBSAA
assessment. Each person may have slightly different backgrounds of knowledge, but that
diversity is purposeful and can leveraged to assess the system with different perspectives.
The different perspectives helped the team of experts logically identify hazards and
provide confidence that no hazards are missed due to a lack of knowledge or perspective.
Limits to human knowledge constrain the hazard identification process. Humans
are biased to the knowledge they have and may not be able to predict a situation that has
not occurred in the past or is extremely rare. For the extent of the research in this thesis, it
is acknowledged that humans may not be able to identify all possible hazards or predict
all functions of every system element. This limitation is an acceptable part of the process
and must be understood for the extent of the safety assessment process. It is not a
flawless process, but the humans have the best intentions to assess the system as honestly
as possible based on their knowledge and experience in the field.
Scoping the list of hazards proved to be complex because two distinct sets of
hazards appeared. The team of experts identified a set of hazards that included a mid-air
collision, but also identified a set of hazards resulting in traffic conflicts without
collisions. The hazard of a traffic conflict does not result in damage to any system and
only requires action from the pilot and sensor operator to adjust flight plans. The results
of a mid-air collision hazard are much different because it may cause the loss of the
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aircraft and possibly human lives. The difference in the hazard condition and separate
outcomes gave the team of personnel reason to create a separate the list of hazards for the
two conditions.
The detailed models shown in the FTA and FHA expose a decomposition
challenge. Decomposition is the act of breaking the whole system down into system
elements. Each level of decomposition can grow the size of the model exponentially, so
the challenge is to keep the model from getting too large while making sure the model is
complete. No two models are alike, and there is no standard for when a model is
considered complete. A general guideline is to decompose the system to a level of detail
the author of the model determines as adequate. The author may have to defend or
explain the decision behind the level of detail chosen.
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Chapter 5
Influence Matrix Framework
After the safety assessment was performed with AFSEC to construct the Risk
Management document the same information provided by Cannon AFB was applied to
the influence matrix (IM) framework. This research task was performed for this thesis to
evaluate insights that can be drawn about the detailed model of the system and the
described safety behavior compared to traditional methods.
5.1 Influence Matrix Framework Motivation
Motivated by the scoping and detailed assessment challenges discussed, past
research conducted at MIT was applied to the Cannon AFB safety assessment. The
influence matrix framework has shown its ability to present a condensed safety model
focused on the relationships system elements and hazards [18].To learn more about the
characteristics and results of the framework, it is applied to the GBSAA system
independently from the traditional methods used by AFSEC. The IM reused the system
description and identified hazards that have already been defined using the work
explained in Chapter 3 and Section 4.3, respectively. This chapter will explain how the
IM framework is scoped and built using the GBSAA system information.
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5.2 Influence Matrix Framework Description
System Elements
H Hi
a H2
z
a H3
- Influence
r Key
d -- S = Strong Influence
s HIW = Weak Influence
Hm = No Influence
Figure 12: Example Influence Matrix [18]
The IM describes the relationship between system elements and hazards by
coupling them together based on the influence each element has on that particular hazard.
The magnitudes of influence will be arranged in the form of an "m x n" influence matrix
shown in Figure 12. The "m" rows of the matrix denote hazards (Hm), and the "n"
columns of the matrix denote system elements (En). Each cell of the matrix is the
influence of the corresponding element to that hazard or risk. Determining the level of
influence requires judgment on behalf of the safety assessor and that will be explained in
more detail in Section 5.3.
Change in
System Element drisk(osystem)
dsystem
Influence - Change in risk level
of Hazard (d risk)
Figure 13: Definition of Influence [18]
The influence is defined conceptually in Figure 13. Influence is a measure of the
change in risk level of a given hazard (Brisk) due to a change in the system element
(asystem). The determination of influence is normally based on the judgment of a safety
assessor. The partial derivative in Figure 13 defines the amount risk changed per a
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change in the system element. It should also be noted that a change in a system element
could also change the severity associated with a risk. This dynamic is not captured in the
framework and would require further refinement in future applications of influence.
Influence represents the ability to affect a level of risk based on the functions or
actions taken by a specific system element. System elements can be aspects of change
without explicit parameters relating it to risk [18]. An example of a system element
change is flight crew performance. While their performance clearly influences some risks
of hazards like pilot induced oscillations, failure to follow procedures, or incorrectly land
the aircraft, the risks may not be parameterized. The training each crew member must
receive teaches the crew how to properly act and function within the system as a whole.
Without that training, crew performance may change which has an influence on risk. To
capture the element of change within the IM framework, the partial derivative value is
defined conceptually and represents the change on risk levels based on a change in
behavior of an element, the crew.
The changes do not necessarily have to be continuous or parametric. Influence as
defined here also does not have a positive or negative sense [18]. Influence may represent
that changes to a system element can expected to only increase risk level, only reduce
risk level, or increase or reduce risk level depending upon the properties of the element.
Influence will be coded based on its absolute magnitude, as described in the following
section.
The influence matrix representation assumes a linear relationship between
elements and risks of hazards. Each influence value is constructed independently of other
system elements. Although this is a limitation of the framework, it does not imply that
expected safety performance of a system is the result of a linear combination of the safety
performance of individual elements [18]. Interactions between elements will exist in a
real system. The complexity in interaction is captured in the detailed modeling and
assessment process, when expected safety performance is evaluated in detail.
5.3 Influence Matrix Framework Application
The primary goal in of the IM framework analysis is to identify all possible
system interactions and accurately determine the influence each system has on a
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particular hazard. The secondary goal is to use that information to provide a safety
assessment method that can assist in determining mitigation and evaluation strategies.
Using the Cannon AFB GBSAA formal list of identified hazards and the system
elements defined in the architecture diagram, the columns and rows are populated for the
influence matrix in Figure 14. With the matrix axes populated, a level of influence must
be determined for each cell in the matrix. The levels of influence for this matrix are
qualitative with three possible options: no influence, weak influence, and strong
influence.
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Sy em Elements
Radar Data Airspace Sensor All Other Air Traffic
No. Hazard Radar(s) Processing Unit Display Pilot Operator Air Traffic RPA controller
HA1 Airspace display failure, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC W W S W W
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit, S S WHA2 leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
HA3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC S W
Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to failure to respond to W S WHA4 intruder and NMAC
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder W S W WHA5 information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and NMAC
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning W S WHA6 system, leading to NMAC
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react, W S W S W WHA7 with a properly functioning system, leading to NMAC
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission), S S S WHA8 resulting in a NMAC
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected S S S WHA9 intruder and NMAC
Erroneous data leads pilot to command unsafe maneuver, resulting in S S W S S WHA10 NMAC
HA11 RPA is not able to maneuver in time to avoid a potential NMAC W W S
HC1 Airspace display failure, leading to a traffic conflict W W S W W
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit, S S WHC2 leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict
HC3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict S W
HC4 Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to a traffic conflict W S W
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder W S W WHC5 information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and a traffic conflict
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning W S WHC6 system, leading to a traffic conflict
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react, W S W S W WHC7 with a properly functioning system, leading to a traffic conflict
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission), S S S WHC8 resulting in a traffic conflict
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected
HC9 intruder and traffic conflict S W
HC10 Inability to communicate with ATC, resulting in traffic conflict S S W S
HN1 Pilot-induced oscillation (PIO) that results in aircraft crashing S
Pilot executing improper take-off or landing procedures that results in S WHN2 aircraft departing runway
Loss of aircraft control (on the ground) due to procedural error. Could S WHN3 result in ground fatalities.
HN4 Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to NMAC S S W
Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to a traffic S S WHN5 conflict
Loss of aircraft power due to engine failure that results in an off field
HN6 landing, resulting in aircraft damage
Loss of aircraft power due to electrical failure that results in an off field
HN7 landing, resulting in aircraft damage
Catastrophic aircraft system failure that results in a crash and ground
HN8 fatalities
HN9 Loss of datalink that results in a near-mid-air-collision (NMAC) W S
Failure to avoid hazardous weather resulting in loss of aircraft and/or S W W S
HN10 ground fatalities
HN11 Uncommanded altitude or course deviation that results in a NMAC S W W S S
HNl Pilot commands unsafe maneuver that results in a NMAC S S W
HNl Loss of datalink that results in a traffic conflict. W S
Figure 14: Influence Matrix Framework
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S = Strong
nfleunce
w =Weak
Influence
blank = No
Influence
As shown in Figure 14, if the influence level is a strong influence it is signified by
an "S", a weak influence is a "W" and no influence is a blank box. Using the partial
derivative in Figure 13, influence can be described as the value of changed risk resulting
from a system element change. The influence could be determined quantitatively based
on failure rates and a fault tree, but for this research, quantitative approaches were not
readily available. A qualitative framework is expected to show similar conclusions. If a
given influence is strong, a large magnitude change in the associated risk will result from
a change in the behavior of the system element. Influence is weak when a small
magnitude change in the associated risk is results from a change in system element
behavior. Weak influences can often act indirectly or in combination with other elements
in the system. Blank boxes indicate no influence between the system element and
associated risk level for that specific hazard. In this case, there is no relationship between
the system element and hazard and do not change the magnitude of risk of that hazard.
Determining the difference between strong, weak, or no influence, requires some
judgment. A decision was made to place thresholds for each influence level and those
thresholds had to remain consistent for the entirety of the model. To explain the
thresholds between the levels of influence the hazards are categorized into three general
modes in which an element may influence a hazard: loss of element function,
faulty/incorrect input data, and misinterpretation of element behavior.
The first mode of system failure is a loss of functionality in an element. For
hazard HAL, "Airspace display failure, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC," the
airspace display element has a strong influence on system failing to function. The display
element can have a complete loss of system function that is not created or caused by any
outside element. The airspace display screen could go blank and not display any
information to the sensor operator. The display could also be set up incorrectly and lose
its ability to function. This change in system behavior results in a high magnitude of risk
that is represented as a strong influence in the matrix.
The strong influence has also been reflected in the FHA and FTA. In the FHA, the
functions of the airspace display are to provide pilot and sensor operator with sensor
information describing the local airspace and provide both visual and audio alerting to
pilot and sensor operator. The failure to perform or incorrect performance of these
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functions directly influences the hazard of "airspace display failure." In the FTA, under
the fault of display failure are the direct system failures as listed above for the strong
influence of the hazard.
The second mode of failure is incorrect data input. There are several systems that
have an input for hazard HAl: the radar(s), radar data processing unit, and all other air
traffic. The reason for their influence is because the radar and data processing unit can
affect the state in which the display operates which could then lead to a failed display
even though the display is functioning correctly. The change is system behavior of the
radar and data processing unit results in a small change in risk because they both have to
contribute to the hazard. These elements have a secondary influence because one system
failing by itself should be noticed but not drastically change the risk level. All other
traffic is a weak influence because of the potential for a NMAC, but the element does not
influence the airspace display failure. Without the presence of the air traffic this hazard
would not exist.
The radar and processing unit can send improper data to display generating a false
picture, but the display could be functioning correctly with the wrong information. This
weak influence is generated by the similar functionality of the radar data system group
described in Section 3.3.2. The additional step beyond the display just failing
independently creates a smaller change in risk and the influence, which is represented as
weak in the matrix. In other words, the change of the radar, data processing unit, or
sensor operator has a low magnitude of risk associated with each change in system
element. Assuming all remaining system elements are functioning as designed, it is
assumed then the operator will be notified or aware of a data error or setting change. The
change in display behavior has a weak influence on the hazard risk because the display
may not lose complete functionality, but the degradation increases the risk of the hazard
occurring.
The third mode of failure for the system in exposed in the misinterpretation of the
system behavior. For hazard HA1, the display could have correct data and be working
properly, but the settings could fail to correctly show the data to the sensor operator. This
could occur if the sensor operator manipulated the display settings or improperly read the
information on the display because the display in zoomed out too far on the local area.
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This is a contributing influence to the hazard, and by itself only changes the magnitude of
risk by a small amount, therefore, it is a weak influence.
The weak influence can again be seen in the FHA and FTA. The function of the
sensor operator is to "Maintain situational awareness of airspace," and incorrectly
performing that function (misreading display) influences the hazard of airspace display
failure. If the information isn't being read correctly, the display is contributing to the
confusion of the operator. In the FTA, the display failure can lead to a false reading or
incorrect decision. The pilot or sensor operator contributes to this hazard, but each is not
the only influencing element. The function of the processor is to "Transmit data to
Airspace Display." The failure to do so or sending corrupt data can lead to an incorrect
display picture, but enough information could get through to the sensor operator to not
create a hazard. The display itself may not fail, but the information could give that
appearance to the sensor operator. In the FTA, the processor error is on an equal level to
the display failure meaning they are both contributing causes to an uninformed pilot, but
not a direct cause to a display failure itself. This shows some influence but not a direct or
strong influence. This situation also occurs for the radars or sensors within the FTA,
again creating a situation for weak influence.
The remaining system elements do not change the magnitude of risk above the
threshold for weak influence because they are completely isolated from the hazard. The
elements either located within another major group of the architecture or the element is
more than two informational steps away from the strong hazard influence, so it will not
have a large enough impact on the risk when the element behavior changes.
To complete the entire influence matrix the same judgment process and
philosophy used for hazard HAl was maintained to populate the influences of the
remaining elements.
5.4 Discussion of Influence Matrix Application
Weak influence can be caused by a data flow of poor information. For example, if a
display does not appear to be working properly, then it does not always mean the display
has lost full functionality. Anything in the stream of the data could be malfunctioning, so
each element within the data stream has a broad influence on all elements reliant on that
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information flow. The radar scans the airspace and sends information to the processing
unit, which provides data to the display. The display is then monitored by the sensor
operator and pilot that control the RPA operating in the airspace. The RPA's position is
again monitored by the radar. The pilot also coordinates with ATC to influence the other
aircraft in the airspace, which is all detected by the radar.
The process discussed above illustrates a closed circuit in the flow of information.
This flow of the information through all elements creates a broad influence and forces the
assessor to use judgment to determine the threshold for what is considered a weak versus
non-influencing element. The threshold was determined by where a system has an
interaction within the same major group that contains the strong influence on the hazard.
Hazard HA1 was described in this fashion in Section 5.3.
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Chapter 6
Clustering Application
Motivated by the scoping and detailed assessment sub-processes, this chapter will
apply clustering techniques to the influence matrix framework for further analysis. This
chapter will document the insights gained from using clustering techniques and how
those insights help support a better understanding of safety assessment methods and the
Cannon Ground-Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) functionality.
6.1 Motivation to Explore Clustering Techniques
Complex interactions created by a complex system provide a need for a safety
assessment method that can accurately model the system and describe safety behavior.
This scoping process can be resource intensive with numerous system elements because
of the large amount of interactions between them. Scope of the FHA and FTA methods
require the user to define all system elements and functions to a high level of detail in
order to assign likelihoods to a final outcome. With a highly complex system, the FHA
and FTA may produce extremely large models that may not be physically able to define
and test every element in every possible condition. Condensing the scope of the model or
determining how to focus recourses may offer advantages to describe and assess safety
behavior of complex systems.
In past research conducted at MIT, the influence matrix framework applied a
notional clustering technique that provided useful insights for scoping a safety
assessment. The research stated that future research can be conducted "...to develop
automated tools to analyze sets of hazards with structured forms of influence" [18]. To
develop automated tools, a formalized method of clustering can be established for the IM
framework. To determine the proper ways to formally cluster the matrix, literature was
reviewed to find similar assessment tools using formal clustering methods.
Clustering hazards may help reduce the amount of recourses spent on analyzing
individual hazards or system elements by analyzing them in groups. It is expected that the
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IM framework will be able to use the clustering techniques due to its matrix format and
similarity to other another matrix safety assessment method.
The IM framework is similar to a Dependency Structure Matrix (DSM). It models
relationships between system elements in a matrix format. Therefore, clustering
approaches for DSMs were explored. The similarities and differences between the DSM
and IM are important in understanding clustering techniques that were originally
designed to be applied to the DSMs. Many of the clustering techniques depend upon the
unique structure of the DSM. While the IM does not have the same physical
characteristics as the DSM, the similarities between them will be explored with the
objective of choosing a clustering technique that will be applied to the IM. The next two
sections of this chapter briefly describe the DSM format and introduce clustering
techniques to further describe the motivation behind this type of research.
6.1.1 Dependency Structure Matrix Format
The Dependency Structure Matrix (DSM) is a matrix formatted method for
describing complex system interactions. It has three similar characteristics to the IM
framework. The first is the goal of each method to identify interactions and relationships
in the system to recommend where to focus analysis. The relationships help expose safety
behaviors of the system like potential critical systems or interoperability issues [32]. The
second common characteristic is that the assessed system is decomposed into elements
that are determined as important for system functionality. Those elements are then listed
on the axis of each matrix. The third is the description of the relationships occurring
within the system elements. The description of a relationship in the DSM or IM may be
binary, but that is not required. One might use a number to indicate the critical
relationships, strength of the relationship, risk, and many other metrics. Both methods can
even describe more than one interaction. The matrix format can determine indirect
couplings and dependencies as well as calculate their impact on the entire system [32].
The main difference between the DSM and IM is how the relationships are
captured. For the DSM, the relationships describe whether or not two elements interact
with each other as a pair. As a notional example, Figure 15 shows a DSM with system
elements A1 through A7 on both the vertical and horizontal axes. The boxes in the matrix
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included a check mark to indicate if the paired elements interact or not. Each check mark
is an individual interaction pair. A diagonal grey line in the DSM is created because the
system element does not create an interaction pair with itself. As described in Section 5.2,
the relationships of the IM describe if the system element interacts with a particular
hazard.
Both of the methods are two-dimensional, but the size of each matrix is different as
a result of the relationships being described. In Figure 15, the DSM uses a matrix that is
defined by "Ax" system elements on each axis. The size of the matrix then becomes "x2 .
As described in Section 5.2, the size of the IM is "m x n."
AU A6
Ik
Figure 15: Dependency Structure Matrix [32]
6.1.2 Clustering Techniques
The objective of DSM clustering is to use the system element individual interaction
pairs and regroup those pairs into a group that defines a relationship at a high-order of
abstraction. This so-called higher-order relationship is a broader relationship within the
group that is common among all included elements. The elements will have similar
interactions, influences, or properties in their behavior as they serve a function within the
overall system [33]. An example of this would be the human circulatory system. The
elements of the heart, veins, arteries, and capillaries each have individual interactions
with other parts of the body, but the high-order relationship is that all of them transport
blood.
DSM clustering techniques have been shown to be useful in identifying
architectural improvement in organizations and product design and development [33].
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Clustering can help to better understand complex interactions within a system
architecture. Then, an assessor can use the clusters to assess the system in a condensed
version to impact future planning and assessment.
Clustering techniques extract further information about the system architecture.
Clustering informs the assessor by identifying elements that behave similarly or
differently in comparison to the rest of the system. Information from that behavior can be
useful for test prioritizing and risk mitigations strategies. The clustering technique
provides the opportunity for the assessor to better understand how the complex system
elements work together to create a larger system entity. Some system elements may have
more interactions than others. The clusters can help system assessors focus attention on
specific elements rather than viewing every possible interaction combination. The
clusters also draw attention to elements that are identified as acting independently of all
other elements. Those independent elements may be easily looked over or forgotten
otherwise. A cluster will highlight a system element interaction where it is not expected
or vice versa.
There are several formal clustering techniques available to use based on several
approaches in literature ([32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41]). Many
potential formal clustering processes were identified: mathematically based, process
based, architecture based, or any combination. A mathematical cluster technique uses a
formula to rearrange the system interactions based on measured parameters and produce
an optimized result. Such techniques can use weighting and relationships counts to find
the most highly involved system elements. A process clustering technique rearranges the
elements based on a specific set of steps. An architecture based technique clusters
interactions by similar functioning system elements or by elements that directly
communicate with each other. Each of these methods achieves a similar objective of
creating clusters.
The objective of each cluster is to maximize interactions within the cluster while
minimizing interactions between the individual clusters. This results in clusters that
contain the most similarity in elements functionality in one cluster. If there is too much
interaction between two clusters, then those may need to be combined. If they do not
interact at all, then the clusters are formed correctly. The assessor must use judgment to
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determine when clusters have a level of interaction where it is not possible to completely
separate the clusters.
It has been suggested to minimize the size of the clusters in order to identify
clusters that only contain elements that behave exactly the same [35]. This objective may
be counterproductive for the purpose of clustering for safety assessment. If the clusters
are minimized in size, then there may be too many clusters for the assessor to determine
which are the most important.
Other work suggests that highly interactive system elements are assigned to a
"controls cluster" that influences all clusters [35]. This technique could be useful for
systems that have control systems that monitor all elements within the architecture.
6.2 Selected Clustering Technique for Influence Matrix
Each of the previously discussed clustering techniques exposes that each system
may have unique architecture properties that can be clustered differently based on the
judgment of the assessor. To inform safety assessment, key objective in applying
clustering are to maximize interactions between hazards and system elements within the
individual cluster while minimizing interactions between the clusters of hazards. Highly
interactive elements within a cluster functionally groups similarly behaving elements for
safety assessment. The secondary objective of the clustering technique is to identify
clusters that are large enough to ensure no influences are left isolated. Removing isolation
eliminates the need for special consideration of resources to be used on just one influence
rather than looking at a group of hazards together. An efficient use of time and resources
analyses groups of hazards and systems rather than just one at a time.
The format of the IM is that each column represents a system elements and each
row is a hazard. By this arrangement, there can be two possible types of clusters. There
can be clusters of system elements that influence similar hazards or clusters of hazards
influenced by similar elements. For the process of safety assessment, the clusters of
hazards influenced by similar elements are expected to provide more insight into the
safety behavior of the overall system. The clusters of hazards are expected to show which
hazards are more critical to the safety of the overall system than others. Critical hazards
will be those that are influenced by the most system elements because those hazards will
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have the most opportunities to be influenced through mitigation strategies or controls that
reduce risk. The clustering of hazards provides an opportunity for the safety assessment
to mitigate groups of hazards that are similarly influenced rather that mitigating each
hazard individually.
The small size of the influence matrix constrained the selection of a specific
clustering method. Because the influence matrix only contains eight system elements and
thirty-four hazards, visual inspection and manipulation was judged to be an adequate
technique. Literature suggests this is appropriate for small or sparse matrices [35]. The
application of clustering by visual inspection to the Cannon GBSA architecture is a
specific process that will be discussed in detail further in Sections 6.2 & 6.3. First,
advantages of visual clustering will be discussed further below.
No single clustering approach is simple, but the visual manipulation allows the
assessor to quickly evaluate the results of clustering by seeing exactly what hazards are
being grouped together or left out. Reordering rows and columns allows the assessor to
build a configuration that optimizes the matrix to gain specific insights about the overall
system. Any influences not included in a larger cluster will be noticed. This isolated
influence will require special attention and verification. The assessor will have to
consider adding the influence into a cluster, if possible, or it must be dealt with
separately. It must not be ignored, but be reassessed and analyzed. A step by step visual
process will be developed for the IM framework with the expectation that clusters will be
identified consistently.
The step by step process will be used several times with different central system
elements. The objective of this approach is to determine if the clustering process used
produces similar or different results when focused on different central system elements.
The starting influence matrix will be the same, but if visual manipulation is used, one
assessor may choose to focus on a specific element that is different from the element
another assessor chose. The comparison of results is expected to produce insight into how
the elements interact and how effective the use of visual manipulation is for a clustering
technique. It is expected that the different central elements will affect the way hazards
cluster together.
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It is expected that some system elements will influence more than one cluster of
hazards. This interaction between clusters will be useful to recognize certain elements
that are contained in more than one cluster. Simply keeping a count of how many clusters
a system element is contained in will show the relative influence level the element has on
the overall system.
Before applying the detailed clustering technique, a basic use of visual
manipulation shows how the process is expected to provide results. A part of the
clustering technique is architecture based by physically separating similar functioning
components. In Figure 16, the system elements have been separated to reflect the major
system groups defined by the architecture diagram described in Chapter 3. These major
groups are physically separated by element functions. Grouping elements by major
system group shows how certain hazards look to only be influenced by a single major
group of elements while others are influenced by multiple major groups. This can be
expected because related system elements within a major group serve similar functions,
therefore, influencing similar hazards. This topic will be readdressed later in the
evaluation of each clustering process.
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No. Hazard
Radar Data Airspace
Di l
HA1 Airspace display failure, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC W W S
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit,
HA2 leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
HA3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC S
Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to failure to respond to
HA4 intruder and NMAC
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder W
HA5 information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and NMAC
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning W
HA6 system, leading to NMAC
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react, W
HA7 with a properly functioning system, leading to NMAC
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission),
HA8 resulting in a NMAC
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected
HA9 intruder and NMAC
Erroneous data leads pilot to command unsafe maneuver, resulting in
HAl0 NMAC S S W
HA11 RPA is not able to maneuver in time to avoid a potential NMAC
HC1 Airspace display failure, leading to a traffic conflict W W S
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit,
HC2 leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict
HC3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict S_
HC4 Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to a traffic conflict
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder W S W
HC5 information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and a traffic conflict
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning W
HC6 system, leading to a traffic conflict
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react, W
HC7 with a properly functioning system, leading to a traffic conflict
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission),
HC8 resulting in a traffic conflict
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected
HC9 intruder and traffic conflict S S S
HC10 Inability to communicate with ATC, resulting in traffic conflict
HN1 Pilot-induced oscillation (PIO) that results in aircraft crashing
Pilot executing improper take-off or landing procedures that results in
HN2 aircraft departing runway
Loss of aircraft control (on the ground) due to procedural error. Could
HN3 result in ground fatalities.
HN4 Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to NMAC
Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to a traffic
HNS conflict
Loss of aircraft power due to engine failure that results in an off field
HN6 landing, resulting in aircraft damage
Loss of aircraft power due to electrical failure that results in an off field
HN7 landing, resulting in aircraft damage
Catastrophic aircraft system failure that results in a crash and ground
HN8 fatalities
HN9 Loss of datalink that results in a near-mid-air-collision (NMAC)
Failure to avoid hazardous weather resulting in loss of aircraft and/or
HN10 ground fatalities
HN11 Uncommanded altitude or course deviation that results in a NMAC
HN12 Pilot commands unsafe maneuver that results in a NMAC
HN13 Loss of datalink that results in a traffic conflict.
Figure 16: Influence Matrix separated by Major System Groups
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6.3 Clustering Technique Application
The clustering technique is divided into two distinct processes of rearranging the
hazards and system elements of the matrix and identifying clusters based on the results of
the rearrangement. A detailed explanation of the matrix clustering technique in a step-by-
step example is included in Appendix D.
6.3.1 Rearrangement Process
The application of the clustering technique begins by re-ordering the system
elements so the central element is in the farthest left column, E1 in Figure 17. With the
central element established, the goal is to establish clusters of hazards based on system
element behavior similar to that of the central element. The hazards influenced by the
central element are then arranged so the hazard that is influenced by the least amount of
other systems is placed at the top of the matrix and the most amount of other systems at
the bottom of the central element hazards. For example, the hazard located at the top is
only influenced by the central element. The next hazards should be arranged from least to
greatest amount of other system elements influencing those hazards until all of the
hazards that the central element influences are listed at the top of the matrix.
The reason for ordering the hazards by the least number of influencing elements
located at the top of the selection and the hazards influenced by the highest number of
elements are at the bottom is to centralize the highly influenced hazards. The least
influenced hazards will only include the central element while the more influenced
hazards will include other elements. This priority method brings highly influenced hazard
up from the bottom of the IM which will help further centralize the most influenced
hazards in the center of the IM and the least influenced hazards will be pushed to the
extreme ends of the IM.
Next, looking horizontally across the matrix at only those hazards the central
element influences, the assessor identifies the element that most closely influences the
same number those hazards already identified and moves it next to the central element.
The priority arrangement technique from the previous step aides in selecting the element
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with the most similar behavior because it will have an influence located closer to the top
of the matrix than the other elements.
These steps are repeated several times until the hazards and elements have run out
of available columns and rows to move into. The steps of rearranging the hazards
influenced by the primary system result in a triangle-type pattern shown in Figure 17.
(grey triangle). The triangle shape is established by rearranging the system elements so
the elements that influence most similar hazards are located to the left of the matrix and
those located to the right are the most different elements when compared to the central
element. This triangle-type rearranging prioritizes the hazards that have those most
amount of influence from other systems to be moved closer to the center of the matrix.
The most influenced hazard by system element count will be located at the bottom of the
triangle. This high count of influence may not be the most influenced hazard in the
system overall, but it is the most influenced hazard that includes the central element.
System Elements
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Figure 17: Rearrangement Shapes
As system elements are rearranged to concentrate similar influences on hazards,
the clusters of hazards are rearranged to group hazards that are influenced by the same
system elements. In Figure 17, the black box shows the concentration of hazards that are
influenced by the same high count of system elements identified by the prioritization of
the hazards for the central element.
As the rearranging process continues, those hazards and elements that are
influenced and behave similarly to the central element hazards are rearranged towards the
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top and left of the matrix, while those elements and hazards that influence and behave
differently move towards the bottom and right of the matrix (outlined white triangle in
Figure 17). This upside-down triangle effect is the result of grouping the most similar
system elements and hazards to that of the central element. As the similarly influenced
hazards are grouped together at the top and left, the unalike systems are pushed to the
right and the differently influenced hazards are pushed to the bottom.
The resulting clusters indicate that a detailed assessment of those hazards and
elements behaving similar to the central element is warranted, while abstracting those
elements unrelated to the central element. Additional, the most influenced hazards by
system element count are located at the bottom of the primary triangle. This results in the
most influenced hazards being pulled to the center of the matrix. The centering of the
most influenced hazards forces those hazards with only a few connections that do not
include the central element to the bottom of the matrix.
The rearrangement process functions to describe the system from the perspective
of the central element. The system elements at the bottom of the upside-down triangle are
the least interacting with the central element and the hazards it influences. Therefore,
those least interacting elements have indirect influence on the central element. This can
allow the assessor to view those elements as more abstract. The assessor may group the
hazards they influence with less detail because from the central element's perspective,
they all behave similarly different and they have that indirect influence the central
element.
The baseline influence matrices were rearranged based on three different central
elements. The first central element selected is the pilot because the pilot is expected to be
the most influential human element within the GBSAA system. The pilot has the most
human interactions with other system elements by communicating with the sensor
operator, air traffic controller, RPA, and viewing the airspace display. Significant safety
mitigations and controls are therefore focused on ensuring pilot performance in the
operating concept. The second central element is the RPA because the RPA is the focus
and main concern for the GBSAA system. The safety of the RPA is critical, and without
it being flown in civil airspace there would be no need for the GBSAA system at all. The
third central element is the radar because the radar is required for the GBSAA system to
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function. Without the radar, no aircraft would be detected, limiting the ability of the RPA
to sense other aircraft in the area which is the primary concern of RPA operations in the
NAS.
The shapes in Figure 17 are not the clusters, but shapes only to aid in visually
observing how the hazards and system elements are rearranged. A step-by-step
explanation of the matrix rearrangement with pictured examples for each step is included
in Appendix D. Appendix D only uses rearrangement of the IM with the pilot selected as
a central element. The rearrangement based on the RPA and Radar central elements are
not explained in such detail. Once the rearrangement of the IM is complete, the cluster
identification begins.
6.3.2 Cluster Identification
As explained in Section 6.2, clusters are defined as groups of hazards that are
influenced by similar system elements. Each cluster can be visually identified as a group
of hazards in rows influenced by a set of system elements across columns. Starting at the
top of the list of hazards, each cluster can be differentiated based on the different set of
system elements that influence each hazard.
The primary objective of clustering is to maximize the number of influences
included in a cluster. This objective can be restated to create clusters that include as few
non-influenced or empty boxes as possible. The secondary objective is to create large
enough clusters so no influences are left isolated. This section will present a few
examples of identified clusters from the IM with the pilot as the central element. The
remaining detailed identification of all clusters for the IM with the pilot as the central
element is explained in Appendix D after the rearrangement steps.
The first hazard in Figure 18 is a single cluster with a 1 x 1 (rows x columns)
dimension. This cluster is a human flight control hazard that only contains one hazard
that is influenced by one system element. This satisfies the primary goal to create a
cluster that maximizes interaction because the single hazard is only influenced by one
element and contains no empty boxes. This cluster successfully functions as producing a
grouping of hazards that have similar system behavior.
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Figure 18: First Cluster with Pilot as Central Element
Moving downward from the first cluster, the next influence cluster is identified in
Figure 19 as a 2 x 2 cluster where only two hazards are influenced by the same two
elements. This cluster defines the hazards that occur due to RPA crew procedures for
departing or arriving at the airfield. The cluster maximizes interaction as it does not
contain a single empty box and it ftinctionally produces a group of hazards that have
similar system behavior.
Radar Data
Sensor AllOther Processing Airspace AirTraffic
No. Hazard Pilot Operator Air Traffic Radar(s) Unit Display RPA Controller
Pilot-Induced oscillation (PIO) that results In
HNS aircraft crashin
procedures that results In aircraft departing
procedural error. could result in ground
HN3 fatalities.
Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status,
Figure 19: Second Cluster with Pilot as Central Element
The first two clusters are separate from each other because the hazards are
influenced by different system elements, but the secondary goal of producing clusters that
do not isolate single influences is not met because the first cluster only contains one
influence. The relationship between these clusters of hazards and whether or not they
should be modified will be discussed in Section 6.4.
The rearrangement process of the hazards and system elements creates a visual
clustering effect that appears in the cluster of hazards in Figure 20 containing HAl 1,
HC1O, HN10, and HN11. This cluster contains hazards that impact the control and
coordination of RPA maneuvers while operating in the civil airspace. The RPA and ATC
system elements did not have a high amount of influence on the system as a whole, so
these elements were forced to the right side of the matrix. The effect of their location in
the matrix results in a set of empty boxes separating the RPA and ATC elements from
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Radar Data
Sensor All Other Processing Airspace AirTraffic
No. Harrd Pliot Oprao Air Traffic Radar(s) Unit Display RPA Controller
Pilot-induced oscillation (Plo) that results in
HN1 aircraftcrashing
Pilot executing Improper take-off or landing
procedures that results in aircraft departing S W
HPI2 runway______
Loss of aircraft control (on the gound) due to
procedural error. Could result In ground S W
HN3 fatallties.
Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status,
HN4 leadingto NMAC
Crew loses situatlona awareness of RPA status. S S
HN5 leadng to a traffic conftlct
Pilot cormands unsafe maneuver that results W
pilot, sensor operator, and all other traffic. These empty boxes are not considered a part
of the cluster because the elements of radar, data processing unit, and airspace display do
not physically influence these hazards at all. Section 6.4 will discuss how the assessor of
the IM must analyze these elements since the cluster does cross over them, but at this
moment, the empty boxes are considered an artifact of the rearranging process. This
cluster is focused on grouping hazards and these hazards are only influenced by the five
identified elements.
Radar Data
ow azlsd Piot Oenstorr ArTraf c Rarl) Ui Dspy RPA Conrle
intruder Is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to
i nttrudars not noticed by RPA crew, leadingto w S w
NMfailure to respond to Instrcder and NMAC
H M is not ableto maneuver intimeto avoid a
H inalItyto comunicate with ATC, resulting in
HCO traffic conflict
Failure to avoid hazardous weather resulting in
HN1O toss of aircraft and/or grudfataities
Unn man ded altitude or coase devation
HN1 that results in a NMAC
Popup Intruder Inside Threat Valumte with
Figure 20: Fourth Cluster with Pilot as Central Element
With a cluster of hazards, there is a possibility of including empty boxes that are
not just an artifact of the framework visual structure. Figure 20 shows the cluster
including two empty boxes for hazard HAl 1 where the Sensor Operator and Air Traffic
Controller do not influence the hazard. The assessor must remember that the objective of
the clusters is to maximize the amount of interactions included within the cluster, so
bringing together a group of hazards may include some non-influencing elements. The
number of non-influencing element can be kept at a minimum, but this may be
contradictory. The contradiction requires a balance between an acceptable and
unacceptable amount of non-influencing elements to be determined. The system assessor
must first consider if there needs to be influence in these boxes or if the hazard should be
located in another cluster. The hazard must be compared to the other hazards already
included the proposed cluster especially considering the system elements influencing the
hazard. If it makes sense that these hazards still be grouped, the non-influencing elements
are accepted rather than producing a separate cluster.
Hazard HAll states that the "RPA is not able to maneuver in time to avoid
NMAC." This hazard describes the situation that occurs if an aircraft is detected directly
in front of the RPA without previous warning. Previous warning may not occur for
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several reasons, but now that the intruding aircraft is detected in front of the RPA, the
pilot must attempt to avoid a collision. Depending on the location of the intruding air
traffic, the pilot may not deflect the control joystick enough or the RPA may not be able
to physically maneuver in time to avoid an NMAC. Assuming all other systems are
working properly, the sensor operator or air traffic controller cannot change the physical
properties of the RPA or the pilot's ability to control the RPA. Therefore, they do not
have influence. The SO and ATC do not have influence into the ability of the aircraft
itself. It could be argued, that the SO could have provided more warning if the radar is
situated in a location to prevent this situation or the ATC should coordinate the flight
path of an aircraft in the close proximity to the RPA. These arguments are true, but better
support the hazard of an undetected air traffic intruder. The behavior of the SO and ATC
still do not change the physical properties of the RPA or pilot. These empty boxes have
been analyzed, and next, the hazard must be determined if it belongs in the cluster
Even with the empty boxes, hazard HAll belongs in the cluster with the other
three hazards in the cluster, HC1O, HN10, and HN 11, because they are influenced by
similar systems and the nature of hazard is similar to the rest of the cluster. The hazards
are all influenced by elements that are included in at least three different major system
groups. All of the hazards are influenced by the crew, all other air traffic, and either the
RPA or ATC. Those system elements are completely unrelated in function and location
of system hardware. They are all uninfluenced by the radar data processing major group.
The hazard HA 1l is similar to that of the other hazards because all of these explain
control and coordination of the RPA movements in the airspace.
6.4 Discussion of Clustering Results
After the clustering process was applied to the IM framework using three different
central elements, the results were compared to see if the clustering technique produced
different clusters of hazards. Beyond discussing the overall results, a detailed comparison
of the clusters developed in each of the matrices will be conducted followed with analysis
of the how these results can be used to inform safety assessment methods.
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The results of the applied clustering technique are shown in Figures 21, 22, and
23 with the different central elements of pilot, RPA, and radar, respectively. The clusters
are numbered in order starting at the top row of the matrix moving downward.
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ss m Elements
Sensor All Other Radar Data Airspace Air Traffic
No. HazardPilot Operator Air Traffic Radar(s) Processing Unit Display RPA Controller
HN1 Pilot-induced oscillation PIO that results in aircraft crashin
Pilot executing improper take-off or landing procedures that results in
HN2 aircraft departing runway#
Loss of aircraft control (on the ground) due to procedural error. Could
HN3 result in ground fatalities.
HSN4 Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to NMAC W
Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to a traffic
HN5 conflict
HN12 Pilot commands unsafe maneuver that results in a NMAC S W
HC4 Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to a traffic conflict W S W
HA4
HA11
Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to failure to respond to
intruder and NMAC W S W 9
RPA is not able to maneuver in time to avoid a potential N MAC
HC10 Inability to communicate with ATC, resulting in traffic conflict
HN10
Failure to avoid hazardous weather resulting in loss of aircraft and/or
ground fatalities
HN11 Uncommanded altitude or course deviation that results in a NMAC
HC7
HA7
HA10
HA1
HA2
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react,
with a properly functioning system, leading to a traffic conflict
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react,
with a prooerlv functioning system. leading to NMAC
Erroneous data leads pilot to command unsafe maneuver, resulting in
NMAC
Airspace displav failure leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
HC1 Airspace display failure, leading to a traffic conflict
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit,
leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
HA3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder
HA5 information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and NMAC
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning
HA6 system, leading to NMAC
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission),
HA8 resulting in a NMAC
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected
HA9 intruder and NMAC
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit,
HC2 leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict
HC3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder
HC5 information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and a traffic conflict
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning
HC6 system, leading to a traffic conflict
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission),
HC8 resulting in a traffic conflict
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected
HC9 intruder and traffic conflict
HN9 Loss of datalink that results in a near-mid-air-collision (NMAC)
HN13 Loss of datalink that results in a traffic conflict.
HN6
Loss of aircraft power due to engine failure that results in an off field
landing, resulting in aircraft damage
Loss of aircraft power due to electrical failure that results in an off field
HN7 landing, resulting in aircraft damage
Catastrophic aircraft system failure that results in a crash and ground
HN8 fatalities
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Figure 21: Clusters with Pilot as Central Element
All Other
No. lHard RPA Air Traffic Radar(s)
Loss of aircraft power due to engine failure that results in an off field
HN6 landing, resulting in aircraft damage
Loss of aircraft power due to electrical failure that results in an off field
HN7 landing, resulting in aircraft damage
Catastrophic aircraft system failure that results in a crash and ground
HN8 fatalities
HN9 Loss of datalink that results in a near-mid-air-collision (NMAC)
HN13 Loss of datalink that results in a traffic conflict.
HA11 RPA is not able to maneuver in time to avoid a potential N MAC
Failure to avoid hazardous weather resulting in loss of aircraft and/or
HN10 ground fatalities
HN11 Uncommanded altitude or course deviation that results in a NMAC
HC10 Inability to communicate with ATC, resulting in traffic conflict
HN4 Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status leading to NMAC
#1
SI w
system Elements
Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to a traffic
HNS conflict
HN12 Pilot commands unsafe maneuver that results in a NMAC
HC4 Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to a traffic conflict
Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to failure to respond to
HA4 intruder and NMAC
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react,
HC7 with a properly functioning system, leading to a traffic conflict
HA1 Airspace display failure, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react,
HA7 with a properly functioning system, leading to NMAC
Erroneous data leads pilot to command unsafe maneuver, resulting in
HA10 NMAC
HC1 Airspace display failure, leading to a traffic conflict
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit,
HA2 leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
HA3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder
HA5 information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and NMAC
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning
HA6 system, leading to NMAC
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission),
HA8 resulting in a NMAC
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected
HA9 intruder and NMAC
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit,
HC2 leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict
HC3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder
HC5 information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and a traffic conflict
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning
HC6 system, leading to a traffic conflict
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission),
HC8 resulting in a traffic conflict
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected
HC9 intruder and traffic conflict
Pilot executing improper take-off or landing procedures that results in
HN2 aircraft departing runway
Loss of aircraft control (on the ground) due to procedural error. Could
HN3 result in ground fatalities.
HN1 Pilot-induced oscillation (PIO) that results in aircraft crashing
Figure 22: Clusters with RPA as Central Element
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All Other IRadar Data Airspace Sensor Air Traffic
No. Hazard rocessing Unit Display Operator Pilot RPA Controller
HA3 Radar degadation leadin to undetected intruder and atacc
HC3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit,HA2 leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
Communication failure between radar and radar data processing unit, W S
HC2 leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict _ _ _
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning W W $HA6 system, leading to NMAC
Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning W W SHC6 system, leading to a traffic conflict
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission),
HA8 resultin in a NMAC
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected
HA9 intruder and NMAC
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission),
HC8 resultin in a traffic conflict
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected
HC9 intruder and traffic conflict
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder
HA5 information includes failure to alert etc. and NMAC
Detection and tracking software failure, leading to incomplete intruder
HC5 information includes failure to alert, etc.) and a traffic conflict
HC1 Airspace displa failure leadin to a traffic conflict
HAl Airspace displa failure, leadin to undetected intruder and NMAC
Erroneous data leads pilot to command unsafe maneuver, resulting in
HA10 NMAC
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react,
HA7 with a #roerl functionin5 stem, leadin to NMAC
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react,
HC7 with a ropen functionin system, leadin to a traffic conflict
HN13 Loss of datalink that results in a traffic conflict.
HN9 Loss of dlatalink that results in a near-mid-air-collision (NMAC)
HC4 Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to a traffic conflict
HN4 Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to NMAC _ _
Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to a traffic W S
HN5 conflict _7
HN12 Pilot commands unsafe maneuver that results in a NMAC W s s
HA4
Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to failure to respond to
intruder and NMAC
HA11 RPA is not able to maneuver in time to avoid a potential NMAC
HC10 Inability to communicate with ATC, resulting in traffic conflict
HN11 Uncommanded altitude or course deviation that results in a NMAC
HN2
Pilot executing improper take-off or landing procedures that results in
aircraft departing runway
Loss of aircraft control (on the ground) due to procedural error. Could
HN3 result in ground fatalities.
Failure to avoid hazardous weather resulting in loss of aircraft and/or
HN10 ground fatalities
HKl Pio-nueosilto(PDthtrslsiaicatrahn
w S 1w W
k#8
Loss of aircraft power due to engine failure that results in an off field
HN6 _anding, resulting in aircraft damage I I I I
HN7
Loss of aircraft power due to electrical failure that results in an off field
landing, resulting in aircraft damage
HN Iataitrie aircraft system failure that results in a crash and groundT__I____[_____I__I
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Figure 23: Clusters with Radar as Central Element
At first glance, the number of identified clusters is compared. With the pilot and
RPA as a central element, there are nine clusters with slight differences in the hazards
included each cluster. When radar is the central element, the technique produced thirteen
clusters with even more differences of the hazards included in each cluster when
compared to the pilot or RPA results.
Figure 24 is a detailed comparison of the individual identified clusters in each of
the central element approaches. The common clusters are identical in each of the
approaches. They are identical in the hazards that are clustered and the system elements
that influence those clusters. The shared clusters are identical in only two of the three
approaches. The clusters can be shared in three different pairs are shown in Figure 26.
Unique clusters are those that are only identified in one of the approaches. The unique
clusters may be similar to others, but the cluster of hazards and what elements influence
that cluster is unique to a specific central element perspective.
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Central System: Pilot
Cluster # of Influencing Common, Shared
# | Hazards within Cluster Elements or Unique
1 HN1 1 Common
2 HN2, HN3 2 Common
3 HA4, HC4, 3 Common
HN4, HN5, HN12
4 HA11, HC1O, 5 Unique
HN10, HN11
5 HA7, HC7, 6 Shared
HA10 with Radar
6 HA1, HC1 5 Shared
with Radar
7 HA2,HC2 4 Shared
HA3, HC3 with RPA
HA5, HC5
HA6, HC6
HA8, HC8
HA8, HC9
8 HN9, HN13 2 Common
9 HN6, HN7 1 Common
HN8
Central System: RPA
Cluster # of Influencing Common, Shared
# Hazards within Cluster Elements or Unique
1 HN6, HN7 1 Common
HN8
2 HN9, HN13 2 Common
3 HA11 3 Shared
with Radar
4 HN10, HN11 5 Unique
HC10
5 HA4, HC4, 3 Common
HN4, HN5, HN12
6 HC7, HA1 6 Unique
HA7, HA10, HC1
7 HA2, HC2 4 Shared
HA3, HC3 with Pilot
HA5, HC5
HA6, HC6
HA8, HC8
HA8, HC9
8 HN2, HN3 2 Common
9 HN1 1 Common
Central System: Radar
Cluster .# of Influencing Common, Shared
# | Hazards within Cluster Elements or Unique
1 HA3, HC3 2 Unique
2 HA2, HC2 3 Unique
HA6, HC6
3 HA8, HC8 4 Unique
HA9, HC9
HA5, HC5
4 HA1, HC1 5 Shared
with Pilot
5 HA7, HC7 6 Shared
HA10 with Pilot
6 HN9, HN13 2 Common
7 HA4, HC4, 3 Common
HN4, HN5, HN12
8 HA11 3 Shared
with RPA
9 HC10, HN11 5 Unique
10 HN2, HN3 2 Common
11 HN10 4 Unique
12 HN1 1 Common
13 HN6, HN7 1 Common
HN8
Figure 24: Cluster Comparison
Figure 25: Venn Diagram for Cluster Comparison
The cluster descriptions are shown in the Venn diagram in Figure 25 and the
different sections are compared. The common clusters average only 2.3 system elements
influencing the clusters. This means that these clusters are influenced by a relatively low
number of the elements out of the possible eight. Of the five identified common clusters,
the most system elements influencing the cluster was three. None of these clusters where
highly influenced by all the elements and because of that, the clusters could be easily
separated from the other hazards that are more influenced.
The shared clusters in Figure 25 are to visually distinguish how those hazards are
grouped differently depending on the central element. There are some similarities
between two of the three approaches. When the pilot is the central element, cluster #5 and
#6 were identically identified when the radar is the central element. With the radar as the
central element, the corresponding clusters are #5 and #4, respectively. Also, when the
pilot is the central element, cluster #7 matched cluster #7 with the RPA as central
element. Lastly, when the RPA is the central element, cluster #3 matched cluster #8 for
when the radar is the central element.
The insight gained from the shared clusters is that the influences of the system
elements are tightly coupled even when focused on different central elements. The
different central elements did not break these clusters apart and verifies the identification
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of a cluster. Since the hazards are so tightly coupled there is no need to separate these
hazards into smaller clusters. The high interaction between the elements and hazards
allows the assessor to examine the system in groups rather than each hazard individually.
The unique clusters have the most influencing elements on average when
compared to common clusters. The unique clusters have an average of 5, 5.6 and 3.6
influencing elements for the pilot, RPA, and radar approaches respectively. The highly
influenced hazards have more possibilities to be included in or separated from clusters
that are identified in each matrix. The highly influenced hazards are difficult to
differentiate from other hazards because they are influenced by similar system elements
of many other hazards.
The insight gained from the unique clusters is the difficulty to differentiate highly
influenced hazards from other hazards. The reason for this difficultly is because the
highly influenced hazards have similar element behavior impacting the risk of the hazard.
A highly influenced hazard may be impacted by six elements including the central
element, so the hazards influenced by those same elements could be grouped with this
hazard. The unique clusters appear because the central element focus draws those highly
influenced hazards towards the elements that behave similarly to the central element.
The unique clusters impact the safety assessment process because the highly
influenced hazards will need to be assessed in detail to ensure the adequate mitigation
strategies are in place to handle each influence contributing to that particular hazard. The
difficulty in differentiation highlights the complexity of the system and requires the
attention of system experts to further assess those hazards.
When focused on the different central elements, the results produced a high level
of granularity and detailed focus on the central element and those elements behaving
similarly to it. An example of this with the radar is the central system is discussed. The
first three clusters of hazards that were identified with the radar as the central element are
identified as one cluster when the pilot or RPA is the central system. This is intuitive
because if the radar is the central system, more attention is placed into rearranging it
influences rather than on the pilot or RPA influences. The opposite is true when the other
systems are central. When the pilot is the focus, the detailed assessment will be less
focused on the radar system. The difference in detailed focus reinforces the need for
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multiple experts to be involved in the safety assessment process to provide detail on the
entire system rather than on just one central element.
The clusters identified when the radar is the central element are more separated
out than the other two methods because increased granularity around the radar
functionality. This is why the radar-centered matrix had four more clusters than the other
two matrices. The process called for the hazards influenced by the radar data processing
group to be separated into three clusters, but those same hazards are only one hazard
when the pilot and RPA are the central elements.
The clustering process also required the radar element to be separated from the
other elements within its major system group. The all other air traffic element influenced
more similar hazards to the radar than the radar. data processing unit or the airspace
display. This occurred because most hazards created by a radar influence led to an
NMAC or traffic conflict which requires the influence of air traffic. If air traffic is not
present, the state in which the sensing function is in does not pose a hazard to the overall
system.
The effect of external aircraft is consistent with the IM definition of influence
using the partial derivative. The behavior of the external aircraft system element resulted
in a change in risk of the NMAC hazard. It is not a strong influence because the hazard is
strongly created by a fault within another element to allow the external aircraft to get too
close to the RPA to create an NMAC situation. The external aircraft is constantly
changing its position and with each change in position, the level of risk for an NMAC
changes, but not in large magnitudes. It can be argued that the loss of radar functionality
is a hazard with or without air traffic because there would be no way to detect future
intruding aircraft, but again the hazard only depends on the presence of air traffic.
Without other air traffic there would be no need to use a GBSAA system at all.
An insight gained from looking at the "All Other Air Traffic" system element is
its relative influence on all hazards compared to other system elements. The "All Other
Air Traffic" system element has influence on the highest number of hazards out of all
other system elements. This is expected because the main reason GBSAA is being used is
to avoid the external aircraft. If no external aircraft operated in the NAS, then there
would be no concern for aircraft safety. That is why an RPA can operate in restricted
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airspace without a COA because no other aircraft are present in that area. The high
number of hazards influenced shows the relative importance of each system element.
This relative importance emphasizes that external aircraft must be monitored closely to
ensure a traffic conflict and NMAC do not occur. If any system impacts the ability to
monitor the external aircraft, a large amount of risk will be incurred.
The more detailed focus on the central system element is reinforced by the Venn
diagram in Figure 25. The diagram shows that the common clusters have a lower average
number of influencing elements than the unique clusters. The insight gained from the
higher average number of influencing elements is that when a different element is used as
a frame of reference, how that central element influences those hazards that are also
influenced by the majority of other elements changes. With that difference in influence,
the way in which the highly influenced hazards are clustered is different because there is
more focus placed on the central element rather than the clusters themselves. As an
example, the pilot on average uniquely influences more hazards where five elements
influence those same hazards. While the radar element on average more uniquely
influences hazards in which only three elements influence those same hazards.
The most unique clusters across all three matrices are identified as one cluster for
when the pilot is the central element and multiple clusters when the RPA and radar are
the central elements. These clusters include hazards HAll, HCO, HN 11, and HC10.
This cluster is separated into two clusters when the RPA is the central element and three
clusters when the radar is the central element. All of these are considered unique clusters
when classified in the Venn diagram.
The insight gained from the most unique clusters across all three approaches is
that these hazards are influenced by a large number of elements but not so many that each
central element behaves the same for each hazard. The different central elements classify
these hazards differently because of granularity of focus placed on those systems
behaving similar to the central element. The difference in the clusters draws the attention
of the assessor to examine these hazards again. This highlights the importance of system
experts to examine these hazards closely. The IM is successful in allowing the experts to
focus their efforts on only a few of the hazards in question rather having to examine all
hazards again.
83
Category: Critical (6 sys elements)
Central Ele: Pilot RPA Radar
MMHA1 %
HA10 HA10 HA 10
HA7 HA7 HA7
HC1
HC7 HC7 HC7
Total 3 5 3
Category: Moderate (3 sys elements)
Central Ele: Pilot RPA Radar
HN2 HN12' HN12
HA21
HA4 HA4 HA4
VIM* HA6
HC2
HC4 H.C4 HC4
HC6
HN12 HN12 HN12
HN4 HN4 HN4
HN5 HN5 HN5
Total 5 6 101
Category: Important (5 sys elements)
Central Ele: Pilot RPA Radar
HA1 HA1
HC1 HC1
HC10 HC10 HC10
HN10 HN10
HN11 HN11 HN11
HA11
Total 6 3 4
Figure 26: Hazard Comparison by Category
In Figure 26, the individual hazard results of each matrix are compared. The
categories for the figure are as follows: Critical clusters have six system elements
influencing the cluster, Important have five elements influencing the cluster, significant
have four elements, moderate have three, Paired have two, and Independent have one
system element influencing the cluster.
Starting with the critical hazards that are highly influenced, all three matrices
identified HA10, HA7, and HC7. These three hazards are clear critical hazards since all
three matrices produced these results. The RPA focused matrix clusters identified hazards
HAl and HCl as critical, but the other two matrices identified them as important
separating them out because they are only influenced by five elements instead of six.
Next, the IM with the pilot as the central element identified more important hazards with
multiple system influence than the other two IM's. The IM focused on the pilot and RPA
did include more empty boxes than when the radar is the central element. These
differences will be discussed further to analyze if one approach is condensing or
separating clusters too much.
The insight gained from more hazards identified as important hazards is that the
central element may be simplifying hazards too much. This occurs when one hazard has
similar element influence to other hazards, but is actually influenced by more elements
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Category: Significant (4 sys elements)
Central Ele: Pilot RPA Radar
HA2 HA2
HA3 HA3
HA5 HA5 HA5
HA6 HA6
HA8 HA8 HA8
HA9 HA9 HA9
HC2 HC2
HC3 HC3
HC5 HC5 HC51
HC6 HC6
HC8 HC8 HC8
HC9 HC9 HC9
# HN10
Total 12 12 7
Category: Independent (1 sys element)
Central Ele: Pilot RPA Radar
HN1 HN1 HN1
HN6 HN6 HN6
HN7 HN7 HN7
HN8 HN8 HN8
Total 4 4 4
Category: Paired (2 sys elements)
Central Ele: Pilot RPA Radar
HA3
HN13 HN13 HN13
HN2 HN2 HN2
HN3 HN3 HN3
HN9 HN9 HN9
Total 4 4 61
that any other hazard it is grouped with. This forces the group to include many empty
boxes while elevating the category of the hazards. The IM focused on the pilot and RPA
did include more empty boxes than the radar matrix, so that could also expose that
simplification of clusters.
The impact that simplification has on safety assessment is that the some system
elements will be assessed for more hazards than they actually impact. That extra
assessment can be expensive if testing must be conducted, and resources may be taken
away from those hazards that need the extra assessment and testing.
Figure 27 depicts three clusters to be used as an example for how the clusters are
used to formulate mitigation strategies.
Sc~~AIIO1her Procesing Airpae ~ AirTraffic
C6 .r AsTtfft ral Uawit ae spsy RPA Csoalle
NM ead ngto N~MCl
N 2 Pilot n d s ato ma eu 
tht resuls 
N ,ruders notntcdby RPAce, leading to
PA i ot abeinmaneill uvpperkmeofoFd a
Figure 27: Three Example Clusters
For the first cluster, the pilot has a hazard of a pilot induced oscillation (PIO). The
mitigation strategy needs to address the pilot's ability to recognize and handle a PIO.
Since no other element is included in the influence of this hazard, so there is no need to
have mitigation strategies in place for the sensor operator or radar. Those outside
elements are not simply ignored. The assessor reconsiders the hazard to double check that
the outside elements truly do not influence a PIO.
The next cluster from the top, the pilot and SO crew members have a hazard of
losing control of the aircraft due to improper procedures on the ground and during
landing or take-off. The mitigation strategy needs to address the crew member's training
and ability to follow procedures correctly.
For the third cluster, the RPA crew must maintain situational awareness, safe
maneuvers of the RPA, and monitor the airspace display as to not end up in an NMAC or
traffic conflict situation. The mitigation strategy must address the crew training and the
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ability to monitor the external aircraft. The crew can lose situational awareness with no
other aircraft present, but the hazard does not become apparent until the external aircraft
is close to the RPA. Since the all other air traffic influences the hazards in this cluster, the
mitigation strategy must keep the external aircraft away from the RPA at all time. The
other part of the mitigation strategy is to ensure the crew has the ability to monitor the
airspace.
The clustering technique allows the assessor to handle hazards in groups of similar
system elements as well. The mitigation strategies focus only on a few system elements.
An example of this is that the air traffic controller does not need to know how to identify
and solve a procedural error created by the RPA crew.
Beyond determining mitigation strategies, the IM framework provides an
opportunity to condense the safety assessment. Within a particular cluster, there may be
repetitive hazards or hazards that may be combined to help condense the safety
assessment. Even separate clusters may be combined if the assessor decides the two
clusters are to be examined together rather than separately. Again Figure 27 will be used
to provide examples.
In the third cluster there are a few repetitive hazards. The hazards of the crew
losing situational awareness and not noticing the intruder aircraft are each repeated twice.
They are repeated twice because the hazard of an NMAC and traffic conflict differ in
severity, but in terms of hazard influence, the system elements behave identically for an
NMAC or traffic conflict. As long as the mitigation strategy prevents the crew from
losing situational awareness or failing to notice the intruding aircraft then both an NMAC
and a traffic conflict can be avoided. Functionally, condensing hazards allows the
assessor to focus attention on one hazard rather than having to deal with each hazard
individually. The assessor must be careful not to condense the IM too much. Only if the
safety behavior of multiple hazards is identical should they be condensed. If the assessor
feels condensing the hazards may negatively impact the safety of the system, do not
condense.
The first and second clusters involve crew procedure situations that may be able
to be joined together into one cluster. The argument of the first hazard cluster is that the
SO does not impact a PIO, but the SO may be able to be aware of what a PIO looks like
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and could point it out the pilot as it is occurring. If the clusters are combined, the focus of
the assessor is again reduced to one cluster rather than two. The mitigation strategies will
have to be expanded to train the SO on PIO's. If the joining of two clusters is judged to
negatively impact the safety assessment, then the clusters will remain separate.
Further examination of each empty box forces the assessor to think address the
idea that the cluster is wrong and needs to be broken down into smaller units to eliminate
the empty box. The empty boxes in each cluster expose where the assessor set the
threshold for influence because the element is included in the cluster but did not influence
the hazard enough to be labeled a weak or strong influence. The assessor needs to double
check the empty box to determine if the element actually does have influence on that
hazard. This empty box can provide a sanity check for the identification of the clusters.
Radar Data
Sensor All Other Processing Airspace AirTraffic
NO. HU2"f Pilot Opeator AlrTraffic Radar~s Unit Dis RPA Controller
Intruder Is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to W S WHC4 a traffic conflict
Intruder Is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to S WHA4 failure to respond to Inintruder and NMAC
RPA Is not able to maneuver In time to avoid a
HA11 Ptntial NMAC
Inability to communicate with ATC, resulting In
HC10 trafficconflict
Failure to avoid hazardous weather esulting In
HN1D loss of aircraft and/or aound talities
Uncommanded altitude or course deviation
HN11 that results in a NMAC
Pop-up Intruder Inside Threat Volume with
Figure 28: Large Example Cluster
In Figure 28, the large cluster at the bottom of the figure will be examined for its
empty boxes. The hazard cluster contains hazards that involve the crew dealing with a
particular system element failure outside the GCS, but does not involve the radar data
processing major group elements. The top hazard, "HN 11 - RPA is not able to maneuver
in time to avoid a potential NMAC," has three empty boxes to be examined. The first
shows no influence from the sensor operator. The SO does not control the RPA, nor does
the SO have an impact on the physical abilities of the RPA. Changes in the SO's behavior
will not impact the risk of hazard HN 11 occurring resulting in an empty box in the
matrix. Next, the airspace display does not influence the hazard. Again, the display
cannot change the abilities of the pilot or RPA, so the behavior of the display does not
impact the risk of hazard HN 11 occurring. The last empty box shows the ATC has no
influence and again, the behavior of the ATC does not impact the risk of hazard HN 11
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occurring. This quick inspection of the cluster and empty boxes helps verify the ability of
the IM to capture system behavior and hazard influence.
6.5 Summary of Clustering Application
The application of the influence matrix framework and cluster technique produced
several interesting detailed results, but those details can be summarized into boarder
insights that can be compared to the traditional safety assessment methods. These board
insights help extend the knowledge for safety assessment methods and provide rationale
why the IM is an innovative way to assess system safety.
An advantage of the IM framework is the visual link between system elements
and hazards. The direct visual connections allow the assessor to understand which system
elements impact system hazards. The overall number of influences populating the matrix
shows the assessor how complex and tightly coupled the system as a whole.
In contrast to the IM, the FTA and FHA methods can grow in exponential
fashions and be difficult to understand. It is difficult to quickly assess and determine
which system element impacts the largest number of hazards by visual examination of an
FTA or FHA. As the assessors decompose a system into more detail, the FTA adds a new
layer that is usually more numerous than the layer before, and the FHA adds new
functions and systems to the list. There is no direct connection to the hazards themselves
in either method. The FHA points to functions which can be mapped to hazards, but the
final IM illustrates that direct connection without having to reason through all the
functions first.
A second broad insight gained from the application of the IM is the flexibility of
the matrix format. The matrix format allows the assessor to rearrange and manipulate the
order of the hazards and system elements to draw conclusions about the system behavior.
The clustering technique takes advantage of the flexibility of format. The clustering
process of rearrangement and cluster identification functions to constantly reevaluate and
examine the hazards and influencing elements. This technique ensured the IM framework
produced an accurate description and model of the overall system.
The flexibility of the format is a major advantage of this method for initial
assessment of complex systems. The flexible format is capable of handling large lists of
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system elements and large lists of hazards. Even the way the influences are defined is
flexible. The influences can be binary values or even quantified numbers. The assessor of
each system while have to choose what qualities of the matrix will be best on a case-by-
case basis. It may not be possible to force a rigid safety assessment process upon a newly
complex system, so the flexible matrix format can be adjusted to better assess the safety
of the new system.
Unlike the IM, the FTA and FHA are rigid safety assessment methods. The FTA
and FHA cannot switch around branches or subsystems because it would lose the
structure of the method. The structure of the method helps the assessor separate
independent elements or activities, but with a complex system like GBSAA, there are no
completely independent system elements. The specific FTA and FHA structure can make
it difficult for a user to follow the information provided or find the answer to a specific
question relating to hazards. The IM condenses more information in a smaller area than
the FTA or FHA. This provides the opportunity for a complex system to be defined in
one or two pages rather than ten or more pages.
A structured FTA calls for each branch to be independent of each other, but as
systems continue to become more complex, it is difficult to find elements that do not
have a relationship with multiple other elements. The high amount of system influences
makes it difficult to create an FTA that only lists a particular system hazard in one
branch. One hazard may be influenced by several conditions which relate to other
hazards. For the example used at Cannon AFB, the information and functions operate in a
loop form. The pilot talks to the RPA which is detected by the radar that sends
information to the data processor to display in the GCS to the pilot how makes a decision
on what to send back to the RPA. Any function in that loop is influenced by all the
elements within the loop. No one system is completely independent.
The third broad insight gained is the ability of the identified clusters to provide
the assessor with a priority of hazards and system elements. The clusters identify the
specific elements that similarly behave or influence hazards and the overall system
safety. The grouping of common system behavior and influenced hazards provides the
assessor with an understanding of which hazards are critical and which system elements
are tightly coupled to those hazards. That understanding provides a basis for mitigation
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strategies to be better formulated to prevent single or multiple hazards. This priority
system can also be used to help plan a limited testing schedule or allocate finite resources
towards a particular hazard mitigation or system element.
The fourth broad insight emphasizes the importance of evaluating as system from
multiple perspectives. The clustering results explained the detailed differences between
the identified clusters within the central element approaches. Beginning each clustering
process with different central elements increased granularity and detailed attention on
that element but abstracted out those hazards and elements not closely linked to the
central element. This highlights the importance of assessing the safety behavior of an
entire system with the perspective of multiple elements of focus. It is important for an
expert on radar to focus on how the aircraft influences hazards rather than just explain the
radar's impact on hazards. It is also important to begin each safety assessment at different
points of the system rather than always using one standard approach. The different cluster
results exposed that importance that evaluating the system from multiple perspectives
will ensure the detailed influences will be explained from all angles.
The IM framework is a detailed assessment method for modeling system
architecture elements and their relationships. While clustering in this thesis was visually
motivated, several objectives were identified to standardize the process. Simply building
the IM encourages several people and teams of experts to increase their understanding of
the system. That knowledge is important for safety assessment because with more
information understood about the behavior of the system the assessor can better plan to
prevent hazards.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Research
Remotely piloted aircraft operations in the National Airspace System require a
safety assessment process that is reviewed by the Federal Aviation Administration as a
part of the Certificate of Authorization application. An approach was taken in this thesis
to analyze the application and evaluation a set of traditional safety assessment processes
used by the Air Force Safety Center for military RPA operations at Cannon AFB using a
Ground-Based Sense and Avoid system.
The research completed for the Air Force Safety Center's Risk Management
document provided experience with the safety assessment process, a formal list of
hazards for the GBSAA system, architecture diagram, FHA and FTA. That information
was leveraged to apply as a case study of the influence matrix framework. The case study
was motivated by scoping challenges identified in the use of traditional methods and by
previous research outlining the need to apply a formal clustering approach. The clustering
technique provided an opportunity to group hazards and address challenges in the scope
of the safety assessment. In turn, this would allow resources to be better allocated
towards designing mitigation and control strategies in the complex system.
Several insights were gained from the IM framework case study in reference to
the actual framework model, applied clustering technique, clustering results, and
comparisons to the FTA and FHA. The IM framework was shown to provide a visual
link between system elements and hazards. The direct visual connections allowed the
assessor to understand which system elements impact system hazards which contrasted
the large and difficult to understand FTA and FHA methods. Next, the IM illustrated
flexibility to rearrange and manipulate the order of the hazards and system elements to
draw conclusions about the system behavior and ensured an accurate description of the
overall system. Then, the IM revealed the advantage of identified clusters providing the
assessor with a priority of hazards and importance of system elements. Finally, the case
study highlighted the importance of evaluating as system from multiple perspectives. It
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was important to begin the safety assessment at different points of the system rather than
always using one standard approach. The different starting points provide the system with
a detailed assessment of all hazards and not those just evaluated with one central
perspective leaving some elements and hazards abstracted out and generally grouped
together.
Although valuable insights were gained, some aspects of the IM can be explored
further for future research. In applying clustering techniques, some subjectivity was
apparent in how to group system elements and hazards. If clustering was confined to a
standard mathematical algorithm, the results may be more consistent no matter what
element is chosen as a central element. Research could be conducted to build a
mathematical algorithm, but more values for defining influence rather than just strong,
weak, or no influence may need to be defined or quantified.
In this case study, the IM was not used to create numerical values for risk or
overall influence values. The FTA uses functions associated with an "or" or "and"
statement in the structure, but the IM does not have a strict mathematical function
associated with the influence boxes in the matrix. The influence is more of a judgment by
the assessor using the input of system experts. Future research can explore if there is a
method that can be applied to the matrix to provide an actual quantitative value for how
much risk is increased or decreased by a system element.
Future research can be applied to a formal approach to condense and streamline
the safety assessment method. This condensing method could be formulated so that
future, more complex systems can be understood in simple terms. Future research may be
forced to focus greater detail in defining a level of interaction between systems. Simply
managing those interactions will be important so that risks can be mitigated and system
testing can be easily managed.
A drawback of the IM is the fact that this method is not well established or tested.
The framework needs the FTA and FHA to help verify correct information, but currently,
the IM framework is not trusted enough for use. System experts must conduct separate
research to see if the IM framework performs as expected or provides useful results.
Comparing the IM to existing traditional methods helps promote creditability for the IM.
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The review of clustering techniques applied to DSMs identified using a tearing
approach that could possibly be used with the IM. When a system element seems to
complicate the model, it could be possible to "tear" away that element and assess the new
results and see what changed [35]. This may even help provide better results for this IM
because it will increase detailed assessment of less system elements. The tearing method
was not applied to this case study, but future work could explore this approach.
The last identified area for future research is examine the IM's ability to respond
to change within the system quickly after it has already been defined by the IM method.
If a system element changes its inputs or outputs, the relationships between the hazards
and other system elements may change. The entire matrix may have to be re-evaluated
with each change.
In closing, The IM framework was a detailed assessment method for modeling
system architecture elements and their relationships to hazards. Building the IM had one
major benefit above all other insights. That benefit was the increased understanding of
the GBSAA system and safety assessment process for future complex systems. That
knowledge is important because with more information understood about the behavior of
the systems, better plans can be formulated to prevent hazards.
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Appendix A
List of GBSAA Hazards Resulting in NMAC (Near Mid-Air Collision) [2]
# Hazard List
HAl Airspace display failure, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
HA2 Communication failure between radar and airspace processor, leading to undetected intruder
and NMAC
HA3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and NMAC
HA4 Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to failure to respond to intruder and NMAC
HA5 Software failure, leading to incomplete intruder information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and
NMAC
HA6 Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning system, leading to NMAC
HA7 Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react, with a properly functioning
system, leading to NMAC
HA8 Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission), resulting in a NMAC
HA9 Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected intruder and NMAC
HAlO Erroneous data leads pilot to command unsafe maneuver, resulting in NMAC
HAl 1 RPA is not able to maneuver in time to avoid a potential NMAC
List of GBSAA Hazards Resulting in Air Traffic Conflict (but not NMAC) [2]
Traffic within 5 nm horizontally and 1000 feet vertically
# Hazard List
HC1 Airspace display failure, leading to a traffic conflict
HC2 Communication failure between radar and airspace processor, leading to undetected intruder
and a traffic conflict
HC3 Radar degradation, leading to undetected intruder and a traffic conflict
HC4 Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to a traffic conflict
HC5 Software failure, leading to incomplete intruder information (includes failure to alert, etc.) and a
traffic conflict
HC6 Untracked intruder inside Threat Volume, with a properly functioning system, leading to a
traffic conflict
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# Hazard List
HC7 Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with insufficient time to react, with a properly functioning
system, leading to a traffic conflict
HC8 Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop out during mission), resulting in a traffic
conflict
HC9 Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.) leads to undetected intruder and traffic conflict
HC10 Inability to communicate with ATC, resulting in traffic conflict
List of RPA Hazards Not Related to GBSAA [2]
# Hazard List
HN1 Pilot-induced oscillation (PIO) that results in aircraft crashing
HN2 Pilot executing improper take-off or landing procedures that results in aircraft departing runway
HN3 Loss of aircraft control (on the ground) due to procedural error. Could result in ground fatalities.
HN4 Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to NMAC
HN5 Crew loses situational awareness of RPA status, leading to a traffic conflict
HN6 Loss of aircraft power due to engine failure that results in an off field landing, resulting in
aircraft damage
HN7 Loss of aircraft power due to electrical failure that results in an off field landing, resulting in
aircraft damage
HN8 Catastrophic aircraft system failure that results in a crash and ground fatalities
HN9 Loss of datalink that results in a near-mid-air-collision (NMAC)
HN10 Failure to avoid hazardous weather resulting in loss of aircraft and/or ground fatalities
HNi 1 Uncommanded altitude or course deviation that results in a NMAC
HN12 Pilot commands unsafe maneuver that results in a NMAC
HN13 Loss of datalink that results in a traffic conflict.
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Appendix B
Functional Hazard Analysis [2]
1 0 ESCRrPIundN I CONDITION
Based Sensors within field of view of the
sensors
* Transmit sensor data to
processinai units
1.1 Radar * Detect' any objects within field 0 Fails to detect' (hardware failure,
of view algorithm failure, normal non-detection)
e Perform falsely (detecti non-aircraft,
inaccurate plot2)
* Transmit sensor data to Radar * Fails to perform (hardware or software
Data Processing Unit failure, lost connection)
* Perform incorrectly4 (incomplete or
corrupt data sent)
1.2 Radar Data * Receive and process data from * Fails to perform (hardware or software
Processing Unit radar(s) failure, algorithm failure)
* Perform incorrectly4 (incorrect format,
corrupt data)
e Initiate and maintain tracks' of * Fails to perform (hardware or software
aircraft failure, algorithm failure)
e Perform incorrectly4 (inaccurate tracks)
* Transmit compiled data to * Fails to perform (hardware failure, lost
Airspace Display connection)
* Perform incorrectly4 (incorrect or corrupt
data sent)
2.0 Ground e Provide command and control
Control Station of the RPA
* Provide situational capability for --
RPA in launch and mission
phases
2.1 Airspace * Provide pilot and sensor * Fails to perform (No data received from
Display operator with sensor information processor, software or hardware failure
describing the local airspace to display data)
* Perform incorrectly4 (data not displayed
correctly, improper screen settings)
* Provide both visual and audio * Fails to perform (software or hardware
alerting to pilot and sensor failure to alert, speaker failure, screen
operator failure)
* Perform falsely (alerts goes off
unnecessarily)
2.2 Sensor * Maintain situational awareness * Fails to perform (does not look at
Operator of airspace display)
* Perform incorrectly' (interprets display
incorrectly or misunderstands pilot)
2.3 Pilot * Control of RPA through pilot * Fails to perform (hardware or software
interface/datalink failure, loss of link5)
* Perform incorrectly4 (unintentionally
maneuver aircraft)
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* Maintain situational awareness
of airspace/RPA
e Fails to perform (loss of communication
with ATC, or does not look at display)
e Perform incorrectly' (interprets display
incorrectly or misunderstands ATC or
sensor operator)
0 Respond to traffic changes in * Fails to perform (does not maneuver
airspace aircraft when necessary)
* Perform incorrectly' (maneuvers in
wrong direction)
3.0 Remotely e Maintain flight in airspace as . Fails to perform (loss of links,
Piloted Aircraft directed by the pilot subsystem failure of power, controls,
(RPA) etc)
* Perform incorrectly4 (aircraft maneuvers
without pilot input: wind, software error,
improper procedures, etc)
4.0 All Other Air e Fly in correct airspace
Traffic * Fly under proper flight rules and
regulations
4.1 Cooperative e Fly in correct airspace e Fails to perform (aircraft enters
(IFR) Air Traffic restricted airspace without authority)
0 Perform incorrectly4 (aircraft
misunderstands ATC instructions)
0 Fly under proper flight rules and 9 Fails to perform (aircraft flying too fast,
regulations too low, etc without authority)
4.2 Non- 0 Fly in correct airspace e Fails to perform (aircraft enters
cooperative (VFR) restricted airspace without authority)
Air Traffic
* Fly under proper flight rules and o Fails to perform (aircraft flying too fast,
regulations too low, etc without authority)
5.0 Air Traffic * Monitor local airspace around
Control Cannon AFB
e Ensure FAA rules and
regulations are being followed
0 Coordinate maneuvers with air
traffic in local area
5.1 Airspace 0 Provide controller with sensor e Fails to perform (No data received from
Display information describing the local sensors, software or hardware failure to
airspace display data)
* Perform incorrectly4 (data not displayed
correctly, improper screen settings)
5.2 Air Traffic e Monitor local airspace and * Fails to perform (hardware failure, not
Controller airspace display(s) look at displays)
* Perform incorrectly4 (interprets display
incorrectly or incorrect mental model of
aircraft in airspace)
e Coordinate maneuvers with air e Fails to perform (loss of communication
traffic and pilot with pilot)
* Perform incorrectly4 (misunderstands
pilot)
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SY STEM FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION H AZA RD/FAILURE CONDITION
6.0 Back-up e Provide uninterrupted power to
Uninterruptable critical systems when
Power Supply commercial power fails and(UPS) generators are not yet operating
6.1 Radar UPS e Provide uninterrupted power to e Fails to perform (provide no power when
radar when commercial power needed, batteries dead)
fails and generators are not yet
operating
6.2 Airspace 0 Provide uninterrupted power to e Fails to perform (provide no power when
Display UPS Airspace Display Processor needed, batteries dead)
when commercial power fails
and generators are not yet
operating
6.3 GCS UPS e Provide uninterrupted power to e Fails to perform (provide no power when
GSC when commercial power needed, batteries dead)
fails and generators are not yet
operating
6.4 RPA UPS * Provide uninterrupted power to e Fails to perform (provide no power when
RPA when engine power fails needed, batteries dead)
and generators are not yet
operating
6.5 ATC UPS e Provide uninterrupted power to e Fails to perform (provide no power when
ATC when commercial power needed, batteries dead)
fails and generators are not yet
________________ operating ____________________
Glossar
Detect - locate one target at one point in time
2Inaccurate Plot - all plots data have position errors. Accurate plots have small errors,
and inaccurate plots have larger errors. Determining a dividing line between accurate and
inaccurate plots/tracks can be difficult. There are marginal cases where a plot with
significant error is still helpful to the track process. Analysts must determine the dividing
line between accurate and inaccurate.
3Inaccurate Track - every track has position, altitude, and velocity errors. Some of
these are driven by plot position errors, some by timing errors, and some by computer
hiccups. Drawing a firm distinction between accurate and inaccurate tracks is difficult.
Similar to plots, analysts must determine the dividing line between accurate and
inaccurate.
"Incorrectly - means the system attempted to perform an action but the desired result did
not occur
5Lost Link - The RPA has two potential data links between the Ground Control Station
(GCS) and the aircraft. The beyond line of sight (BLOS) link uses SATCOM. There is
also a line-of-sight (LOS) link for ops near the local area. If link is lost, the aircraft
autonomously maneuvers to its programmed lost link route.
6Plot - a detection; location (possibly including altitude) of a target at one point in time
7Track - a data file (and associated on-screen symbol) representing an aircraft's position,
altitude, heading, speed, and possibly other info. A track is initiated from a series of plots
that represent the same aircraft over time. It is maintained as long as sufficient plots are
reported
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Appendix C
Fault Tree Analysis [2]
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Appendix D
Clustering Technique: Step-by-Step Example
For the clustering process to be explained step-by-step, the pilot will be used as
the central element for all pictures as a reference and example. The first step in the
process is to begin by reordering the system elements so the central element (with all its
influences) is in the farthest left column.
Step 1
The second step is to rearrange the hazards the central element influences by
bringing them to the top of the matrix. Once brought to the top, the hazards will be
arranged so the hazard that is influenced by the least amount of other systems should be
placed at the top of the matrix. For the pilot example, the hazard located at the top is only
influenced by the pilot. The next hazards should be arranged from the least to greatest
number of other system elements influencing that hazard.
Step 2
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The reason for ordering the hazards so that are influenced by the least number of
elements are located at the top of the selection and the hazards influenced by the highest
number of elements are at the bottom is to centralize the highly influenced hazards. The
least influenced hazards at the top will only include the central element and maybe one
other element. The more influenced hazards will include more elements which is
beneficial for the next step in rearranging. This priority method also brings more
influenced hazards up from the bottom of the IM which will help further centralize the
most influenced hazards in the center of the IM and the least influenced hazards will be
pushed to the top and bottom of the IM.
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Step 3
The fourth step is to rearrange the hazards again. Those hazards already arranged
for the pilot influence should not be adjusted again. Rearrange any hazards influenced by
new element (the senor operator in this example) but not influenced by the central
element (pilot) by moving them upward to join the group of already collected hazards.
Again, do not rearrange any hazards in the upper portion of the matrix that were arranged
and prioritized in previous steps.
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position. The fifth step is again to access across rows at only those hazards the pilot and
sensor operator influence and determine what other system element influences the highest
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number of those hazards. In this situation it is all other traffic. Now
left so it is situated just to the right of the sensor operator column.
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Step 5
The next step again rearranges the hazards not influenced by the pilot or sensor
operator, but are influenced by all other traffic. Rearrange by moving the hazards upward
to join the group of already collected hazards. Do not rearrange any hazards in the upper
portion of the matrix that were arranged and prioritized in previous steps.
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Step 6
Repeat the step of accessing across the rows at only those hazards the pilot,
sensor operator, and all other traffic influence and determine what other system element
influences the majority of those hazards identified. In this situation it is a tie between the
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radar and radar data processing unit. This is consistent with reality because they have
similar functions in the sensing function of the GBSAA system. Now, continue to repeat
steps 5 and 6 until the systems elements and hazards no longer need to be adjusted.
With only a few system elements left, the attention of the builder should focus on
the hazards and system elements that have not already been arranged. For the example, it
only leaves a few rows and columns located at the bottom right-hand side of the matrix.
The process of moving the most similar influences to the left and upward to join the
cluster should take place, if possible.
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Step 9
Once the rearranging is complete, cluster identification begins.
The clusters are identified by a cluster of hazards that are influenced by system
elements. With that description, the visual form of clusters is groups of hazards in rows
with the system element influences shown in each column. Starting with the upper left
corner of the matrix the first cluster can be identified. For the example, the single
influence is a single cluster of 1 x 1 (rows x columns) dimension. This cluster only
contains one hazard that is influenced by one system element. This satisfies the goal to
create a cluster with no interaction with other clusters and it contains no empty boxes.
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Cluster 1 Colored Blue
Moving downward from the first cluster, the next influence cluster is identified as
a 2 x 2 cluster where only two systems and two hazards influence each other. This cluster
contains two hazards that are influenced by the same two system elements. No empty
boxes are contained within the cluster.
Rader Data
Sensor Allother Processing Airspace AirTraffic
N6. H rPlot O AirTraffic Radars) Unit Dsplay RPA Controller
P Cr e Oi a s ll tl o n (P IO } otAt re su lts in
Plot C impropertake-off r land
prt b clu sthat relts in 
ticrcft departing
bO af aircraft controlwh n t e oundo due to
procedural erro. Could result In ground
N3 fetlities.
Crew loses stuatoal saartensof PA t tus,
Cluster 2 Colored Green
Next, below cluster 2 is the next influence cluster identified as a 5 x 3 cluster
where only five hazards are influenced by the same three system elements, and no empty
boxes are contained within the cluster.
Reodar DatYSensor All Olter Pr ctiieg Adrpace Air TrafrwC
Nr aenard y te a rTraftc Radars) Unit Display RPA Contrler
Pthert-unducsdThscem lation ( c tn) that resutts in
procedures that results in iraeft de p ing
procedural error. Could result inground
HN3 fatualities.
Cre l ssstutonal awareness of RPA status.HN4 lednto NMA
Crew elst situationa awareness of RPA status, s o tHNS leadingto atraficconn1ict
Pilot commands unsafe maneuver that results S W
HN12 in a NMAC
Intruder Is not noticed by %PA a"e, leading to W S W
HCA atraffcconflict
Intruder Is not noticed by RPA cre, leading to W S W
HA4 failure to respond to Intruder and NMAC
RPA Is not able to maneuver in time to avoida
Cluster 3 Colored Yellow
Below cluster 3 is the next influence cluster is identified as a cluster where four
hazards are influenced by the same system five elements. There is no interaction with
other clusters. The empty boxes contained within the cluster are discussed in Section 6.3.
The four hazards are clustered by visual inspection. The empty boxes between the five
system elements are an artifact of the extension of the cluster to include the elements of
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RPA and ATC and are shaded a light red color. Those empty boxes are not considered a
part of the cluster. The extension of including the RPA and ATC system elements in the
cluster creates a different cluster of hazards from cluster 3.
Cluster 4 Colored Maroon
The next cluster of hazards contains a group of three hazards that are the only
influenced by the same set of six system elements. There is no interaction with other
clusters and no empty boxes are contained within the cluster.
Radar Data
O~ W All Other Processing Airspace' ANrTafi
_1 N O. d plt Air Trafi Radarts) unit Dispa RPA Controalr
Failure to avoid hazardous weather resulting in
HNIsO Ion of aircraftandtor gound iataities
Uncommanded altitude or course deviation
HNUI tht results In a NMAC
Pop-up Intruder Inside Threat Vohanme with
insufficient timeto react, with a properly
HA7 function sm, leading to NMAC
Erroneous data leads pilot to command unsafe
HAIG aneuver, resultin In NMAC
Pop-up intruder inside Threat Volume with
insufficient time to react, with a properly
HC7 functioning system,leadingtotrafftconfict
Airspace display failure, leading to undetected
Cluster 5 Colored Red
Below cluster 5, a pair of hazards contains are only influenced by the same set of
five system elements. These five system elements are similar to those elements in cluster
5, but this separate cluster satisfies the primary goals of the clustering. There is no
interaction with other clusters and no empty boxes are contained within the cluster.
Cluster 6 Colored Dark Orange
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Radar Det
Sensor Al tw Processing Airspace AiTrfc
tax I* iilo Operator Ai~afcRadar(s) unit Display P Cotler
Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to
HC4 8 traficconifict
Intruder is not noticed by RPA crew, leading to
HA4 failureto to Intruderand NMAC
RPA is not able to maneuver in timeto avoid a
HAIIptnilNA
Inability to communicate with ATC, resulting in
Fatwe to avotd hazardous weather resulting In
HNIDi lossofaircraftand/orgrndnfatalities
Uncommanded altitude or course deviation
HN11 that results in a NMAC
Pop-up Intruder inside Threat Volume within-ffilant tim Mn waart with , nmnrl W w W w
Moving downward from cluster 6, the next set of clustered hazards are influenced
by the same set of four system elements. This cluster contains twelve hazards. There is no
interaction with other clusters and only a few empty boxes.
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Cluster 7 Colored Light Orange
After cluster 7, a pair of hazards contains are only influenced by the same set of
two system elements. Even though there are visible empty boxes between the two
systems, this is still considered a 2 x 2 cluster due to two hazards and two elements. The
space between the elements is an artifact of the cluster technique as it approached the end
of the matrix. There is no interaction with other clusters and no empty boxes are
contained within the cluster.
Cluster 8 Colored Green
With all other clusters indentified, only a group of three hazards remained that are
only influenced by the same system element. There is no interaction with other clusters
and no empty boxes are contained within the cluster.
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AirTraffic
Controller
Radar Data
Sensor All Other Promessing Airspace AirTraffic
No. Hazard Pilot Operator AirTraffic Radar(s) Unit D RPA Controller
Limited sense and avoid capability (GBSAA drop
out during mission), resulting in a traffic
HC8 conflict
Degraded GBSAA system (due to weather, etc.)
IIC9 leads to undetected intruder and traffic conflict
Loss of datalink that results in a near-mid-air-
HN9 collision (NMAC
HN13 Loss of datallnk that results in a traffic conflIct,
Loss of aircraft power due to engine failurethat
results in an off field landing, resulting in
HN6 aircraftdamage____
Loss of aircraft power due to electrical failure
that results in an off field landing, resulting In
HN7 aircraft dame
Catastrophic aircraft system failure that results
HNS in a crash and ground fatalities
Cluster 9 Colored Blue
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